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Abstract 
At its core, the goal of a firm is to create sustainable profitability. And corporate governance should work to ensure 
this steady increase in corporate performance. Understanding the impact of corporate governance on firm 
profitability has warranted a special attention over time by different fields of scientific knowledge. This study was 
aimed to explore the relationship between corporate governance and profitability of firms, employing eight food 
and beverages firms listed in the Nigerian Stock Exchange from 2004 to 2014.  The data were analysed using basic 
descriptive and inferential statistics with Ordinary Least Square multiple regression in a panel data setting. The 
results revealed that at 5 per cent level of significance, board size has positive relationship with return on equity 
and net assets per share. However, board composition has negative relationship with return on equity but with 
positive association with net assets per share. Board skills and competence has negative relationship with return 
on equity and net assets per share, while board gender diversity results indicated positive relationship with return 
on equity and net assets per share. Despite the mixed results, it can be argued that the empirical results support the 
contention that corporate governance has a positive relationship with profitability of firms. The study recommends 
among other things, that Nigerian food and beverages firms should adopt effective corporate governance practice 
as a panacea to firm growth and survival. Further research using corporate governance processes and profitability 
will not only add value in explaining performance of firms, but also add value to the academic literature. 
Keywords: corporate governance; board; profitability; food and beverages; listed firms; Nigeria. 
 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Statement of Research Problem 
Professor Abraham H. Maslow (1908 – 1970) was indeed right when in 1954 postulated that the physiological 
needs that influence the behaviour of man to action include hunger and thirst for food and beverages. Ever since, 
food and beverages have remained the most basic hierarchy of need, and which must be relatively well satisfied 
before the man is able to function at a higher level. Also, without food and beverages other higher needs will not 
be met. To leapfrog from the aforementioned, there is clear evidence that food and beverages are largely relied 
upon by the people of the world. Today, over 7.5 billon people that make up the world population need food and 
beverages for their survival and effective functioning. Nigeria, in particular, has about 180 million people that rely 
heavily on food and beverages as the primary source of their motivation to improve performance. Whereas, it is 
only 23 publicly listed companies on the Nigerian Stock Exchange are involved in the food and beverages business. 
This presumably suggests for high profitability in the sector following the simple demand and supply mechanisms 
of economics. This expectation, however, could not be realized as deemed. This contradicting situation is not only 
found in Nigeria, also, elsewhere in the world. Hence, the question of what should have been the potential 
influencing factor of profitability in food and beverages firms has long been occupying the mind of many 
researchers. Also, it has been observed that the international and national business landscapes are rapidly changing; 
food and beverages sector is not left behind in this direction. “Globalization and technology have continuing speed”, 
manufacturing and trading arenas are becoming more open, “new products and services are flooding the market” 
and still, some of the food and beverages firms remain permanently in the state of continuously declining 
profitability. It has been wandered what could be the hope of this industry to remain in business. However, one 
fact remains that cannot be changed is the need for countries to have sound resilient system of corporate 
governance that will use competition to strengthen and upgrade their economic sectors to rake high profitability 
for growth and survival in an increasingly open environment. Corporate governance thus, remains the key factor 
that is highly depended upon to restoring profitability confidence of firms and keeps the business flagship fluttering 
and the economy strong, viable and vibrant. This implies that corporate governance is a requisite for survival and 
a gauge of how predictable the system for doing business in any country is (Oluwafemi, et al. 2013). In developing 
countries, the importance of corporate governance is to strengthen the foundation of society and chip into the 
global economy (Matama, 2008). It has also been argued that no firm performance will ever be better than the 
quality of corporate governance practice that influences it. In other words, corporate governance seems to have 
the capacity to determine firm profitability. This makes it very crucial and important to study the impact of 
corporate governance on profitability of firms. Good corporate governance is a critical factor in achieving 
profitable long – term growth for companies. Nwonyuku (2012a) identifies that all the literature researches 
consulted have one common fulcrum that by promoting good corporate governance practices, the firm value will 
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also increase. More so, past studies and authors have linked corporate governance to profitability (Gompers, et al; 
2003; Brown and Caylor, 2004; Sachs, 2007; Selvaggi and Upton 2008; Eisenhofer, 2010; Kashif, 2008; Mutalib, 
2012). Many studies have also shown that good corporate governance maximizes the profitability and long – term 
value of the firm for shareholders, while some other empirical findings suggest contrary to this positive relationship. 
The correlation between corporate governance and profitability of firms ‘are hotly debated issues among managers 
and scholars.’ Further, many researchers have made a number of efforts to explore theoretical models which could 
be used to improve firm’s profitability (Pratheepan, 2014:1) and similar efforts have also been made in corporate 
governance. Understanding the impact of corporate governance on firm performance is unarguably of the most 
fertile fields of analysis in strategic management, industrial economists, law, portfolio management, accounting 
and finance researches. Yet, the extent of corporate governance practice and profitability of food and beverages 
firms in Nigeria has not been sufficiently investigated. It is as against this background that this study tends to find 
out whether any linear relationship does exist between corporate governance and profitability for a sample of food 
and beverages firms listed in the Nigerian Stock Exchange for the period of 2004 to 2014; and looking at the roles 
of corporate governance proxies: board size, board composition, and board skills and competence, and board 
diversity with profitability indicators of return on equity and net assets per share. 
 
1.2 Objectives of Study  
This study is designed to determine whether corporate governance has positive relationship with profitability of 
food and beverages firms in Nigeria through the following objectives: 
1. To test whether size of the board of directors has positive relationship with profitability of food and 
beverages firms in Nigeria. 
2. To test whether board composition is positively associated with the profitability of food and beverages 
firms in Nigeria. 
3. To test whether board skills and competence has positive relationship with profitability of food and 
beverages firms in Nigeria. 
4. To test whether board gender diversity has positive correlation with profitability of food and beverages 
firms in Nigeria. 
 
1.3 Research Questions 
In order to gain an insight and understand the nature of relationship between corporate governance and profitability 
of food and beverages firms in Nigeria, the following questions are addressed in this study. 
1. Does size of board of directors have positive relationship with profitability of food and beverages firms 
in Nigeria? 
2. Does board composition positively associate with the profitability of food and beverages firms in Nigeria? 
3. Is there a positive relationship between board skills and competence and profitability of food and 
beverages firms in Nigeria? 
4. Is there a positive correlation between board gender diversity and profitability of food and beverages 
firms in Nigeria? 
 
1.4 Statement of Research Hypothesis 
In keeping in view the light of research objectives, four hypotheses were formulated and operationalized for 
analysis and drawing conclusion on the relationship between corporate governance and profitability in the study. 
HYPOTHESIS ONE 
Ho1: The size of the board of directors has negative relationship with profitability of food and beverages firms in 
Nigeria. 
HA1: The size of the board of directors has positive relationship with profitability of food and beverages firms in 
Nigeria. 
HYPOTHESIS TWO 
Ho2: The board composition is negatively associated with the profitability of food and beverages firms in Nigeria. 
HA2: The board composition is positively associated with the profitability of food and beverages firms in Nigeria. 
HYPOTHESIS THREE 
Ho3: Board skills and competence has negative relationship with profitability of food and beverages firms in 
Nigeria. 
HA3: Board skills and competence has positive relationship with profitability of food and beverages firms in 
Nigeria. 
HYPOTHESIS FOUR 
Ho4: There is negative correlation between board gender diversity and profitability of food and beverages firms 
in Nigeria. 
HA4: There is positive correlation between board gender diversity and profitability of food and beverages firms in 
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1.5 Delimitation of the Study 
This study is centred on the examination of relationship between corporate governance and profitability of food 
and beverages firms listed on the floor of Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE). The research covers the period of 11 
years, spanning from 2004 to 2014. This period was selected in order to examine the post effect of the 2003 code 
of corporate governance on profitability of firms. The food and beverages sector of Nigeria is selected because of 
the importance of the industry in producing one of the most essential physiological needs of man. Companies that 
are not in the food and beverages sector are not included as they have different assets, financing and operational 
cost requirements as well as profitability benchmark compared to companies under investigation. Further, the 
spectrum of corporate governance is very wide as it has many determinable elements. Consequently, the study is 
streamlined to the researcher’s interest, relevant and easily measurable characteristics of the corporate governance 
system of board size, board composition, board skills and competence and board diversity as independent variables. 
Similarly, the measure of profitability is focused on return on equity and net assets per share as dependent variables 
and firm size as control variable. 
 
1.6 Justification and Significance of the Study. 
Inculcating an enduring role of codes of best practices in the corporate world today remains an indelible footprint 
on the sands of time. Even though it is very challenging, it is a brick which must be laid with strong determination 
if any economy is serious to be developed. Particularly in Nigeria, where corruption and impunity have anchored 
in every nook and crane of the economy, the literature of promoting good corporate governance codes remains the 
only hope of restoring public confidence and to boost competition, marketing, commercialization, profitability, 
investment stream, and food and beverages firms in particular. Also, as added by Adegbite (2012), this study brings 
to the fore the need for countries to fashion out their corporate governance regulatory strategies in ways which 
deal peculiar challenges, albeit within an umbrella behaviour. Even boards of directors and top management will 
find this study useful in reviewing the strategies to improve the quality of corporate governance of their firms. 
Finally, the study will provide avenue to further research into the topic of corporate governance and profitability 
of food and beverages firms in Nigeria. 
 
2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1.0 Introduction 
Corporate governance and profitability are the twilight zone of a firm. Every corporation has the intention to 
continue its existence to perpetuity through sustainable profitability. The ability to maintain high profitability of a 
firm is depending on the robustness of corporate governance in making healthy strategic decisions. Contemporary 
corporate governance began in 1992 with the Cadbury report in the United Kingdom.  It is about what the board 
of company does and how it sets the values of the company, and it is to be distinguished from the day to day 
operational management of the company by full – time executives (FRC, 2014). Corporate governance provides 
the structure and process by which companies are efficiently directed and controlled towards maximizing the 
wealth creating objective of the firm. SEBI (2003) believes that companies having good corporate governance 
system in place are rewarded by investors and markets with high valuations. Aggarwal (2013), states that good 
corporate governance is integral to the very existence of a company. It inspires and strengthens investor’s 
confidence by ensuring firm’s commitment to higher growth and profits. Thus, strategic decisions making in regard 
to firm future profitability will not be effective without good corporate governance practices. Corporate 
governance practice is the soul of corporate business. Following its importance in improving corporate financial 
performance, and achieving corporate objectives, corporate governance has also been referred to as: Corporate 
administration, corporate command, corporate executives, corporate polity, corporate control, corporate direction, 
corporate guidance, corporate power, corporate law, corporate domination, corporate influence, corporate 
government, corporate authority, corporate empire, corporate charge, corporate powers–that–be, corporate 
oversight, corporate supervision, corporate regulation, corporate management, corporate dominion, corporate 
jurisdiction, corporate handling, corporate rule and corporate policies. On the other hand, profitability provides a 
microscopic view of the firm’s economic wellbeing and the efficiency of the firm’s board and management. 
Profitability thus, is a life wire gauge for evaluating, monitoring managerial and measuring performance of those 
charged with the responsibility of corporate management, including the overall roles of the board in maintaining 
the wheel of the entity. Glautier, et al. (2011) see profitability as an index that expresses the gain over the cost 
involved. The uncertainty attached to the possibility of realizing gains in competitive markets heightens the need 
for the knowledge of costs and the system of corporate governance practice that may give rise to profitability. 
There is therefore an overwhelming influence of corporate governance on corporate profitability which suggests 
that, there is a strong association between corporate governance and the firm profitability. 
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2.1.1 General Perspective of Corporate Governance 
Today, researchers and authors are finding it difficult on the best way to approach the issue of corporate governance 
ever since it has become a global phenomenon and widely studied. Like most social science concepts, it does not 
have a universally accepted definition which enjoys consensus of views in all circumstances and environments. 
This is due to the inherent disparities in firm structural, cultural, social, economic, legal settings of countries as 
well as the perspectives of the researchers, regulators and practitioners. Accordingly, corporate governance can be 
viewed from at least two major perspectives: “the narrow and the broad.” The narrow perspective in this regard 
refers to the agency and shareholder value theories of corporate governance, while the broad perspective refers to 
the stewardship, stakeholder, resource dependency, political and value–synergy theories of corporate governance. 
In a nutshell, the narrow perspective describes corporate governance primarily as being concerned with ensuring 
that the firm is run in the best interest of shareholders. The ultimate goal here is to ensure that corporate 
management practice is geared towards maximizing shareholders value alone. The proponents of this perspective 
generally define corporate governance as the process by which suppliers of funds exert control over managers in 
order to ensure that their capital is not only safe from being expropriated, also earn a return on their investment. 
This perspective of corporate administration suffers the weakness of relegating corporate polity by looking at only 
one side of the many sided components of a firm. While considering only the relevance and rewards of suppliers 
of funds, it ignores the vital aspects of governance structure and process that will lead to convergence of managers’ 
and shareholders’ interest, among other legitimate groups. On the other hand, the broad perspective sees corporate 
control primarily as being concerned with ensuring that the firms are run in such a way that corporations’ resources 
are used efficiently in the best interest of all affected groups. The ultimate objective here is to ensure that corporate 
governance practice is operated towards making contributions to every stakeholder. It has also been debated that 
the broad perspective suffers from the inability to provide the structures and processes of achieving the meditating 
role of corporate direction. Based on this view, many authors have defined corporate governance as a mechanism 
that is concerned with ways in which all parties interested in the firm’s well–being attempt to ensure that managers 
and other insiders take measures that safeguard the interest of the stakeholders. Every other definition of corporate 
governance takes its precedence from these two perspectives containing the various theories in corporate 
governance. Cadbury Committee Report (1992) provides a useful definition of corporate governance as “the 
system by which corporations are directed and controlled” in the interests of shareholders and other stakeholders. 
The implication of this definition is that companies are directed and controlled from inside and outside the 
company. Neuberger and Lank (1998) perceived the concept as structure and processes to direct and control 
corporations and to account for their operations. Even though, the Nigeria national code of corporate governance 
could not provide any definition for the subject matter, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) in 2014, defines the 
concept in a similar way International Monetary Funds (IMF) does as the rules, processes, or laws by which 
institutions are operated, regulated and governed. In Thailand, the National Corporate Governance Committee 
(NCGC) defines the term as a system having a corporate control structure combining strong leadership and 
operations monitoring. The Asian Development has defined it as the manner in which authority is exercised in the 
management of a country’s social and economic resources for development. Okereke (2013) and Keasy, et al. 
(1997), see corporate governance as the set of structures, processes, customs, policies, laws, and institutions 
affecting the way corporations are directed, administered or controlled as well as the relationships among the many 
stakeholders involved and the goals for which the corporation is governed. Oyediran (2003) refers corporate 
governance to the manner in which the power of a corporation is exercised in the management of its total portfolio 
of socio and economic resources with the aim of increasing shareholders’ value and safeguarding the interest of 
other stakeholders in the context of its corporate mission. Further, it can be described as the process by which 
persons entrusted with the responsibility of direction and control ensure accountability, transparency and fairness 
in the identification, measurement, summary, preparation, interpretation and communication of economic events 
required to determine the performance of the corporation in the interest of all stakeholders. Corporate governance 
is a system  that requires ‘intellectual integrity’, ‘intellectual honesty’, ‘intellectual competence’, ‘intellectual 
behaviour’ and ‘intellectual leadership’ that will generate value – synergy effect to maximize the long-time value 
of the firm for the benefit of all interest groups.  Accordingly, corporate governance is the process that establishes 
a culture of behaviour in an organization; employs and deploys the requisite resources for planned performance in 
a manner that will maximize corporate value and improve the wellbeing of all groups without compromising to 
any party. OECD (2004) defines corporate governance as: “a set of relationships between a company’s 
management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders.” According to OECD (2004), corporate 
governance provides the structure through which the objectives of the company are set, and the means of attaining 
those objectives and monitoring performance are determined. Cadbury (1992) in United Kingdom Commission 
Report tried to harmonize the various views of corporate governance when he stated that corporate governance is 
concerned with holding the balance between economic and social goals and between individual and commercial 
goals. According to Tricker (1994) and Oteh (2013), corporate governance essentially involves balancing the 
interest of the many groups in a firm – these include its shareholders, management, customers, suppliers, financers, 
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government and the community. The governance framework is there to encourage the different use of resources 
and equally to require accountability for the stewardship of those resources. The aim is to align as nearly as possible 
the interests of individuals, corporations and society.  
2.1.2 Purposes and Objectives of Corporate Governance 
The primary objective of sound corporate governance is to improve corporate performance and accountability and 
creating long-term shareholder value by monitoring those parties within a company which control the resources 
owned by investors. The supporting purposes are to ensure that there is a suitable balance of power on the board 
of directors; make the board of directors responsible for monitoring and managing risk; ensure the external auditors 
are independent; to increase level of confidence and transparency in company activities for all investors and thus 
promote growth; ensure that the company is run in a legal and ethical manner; and build in control at the top that 
will “cascade” down the organization. The 2012 UK combined code on corporate governance and FRC (2014) 
note that the purpose of corporate governance is to facilitate effective, entrepreneurial and prudent management 
that can deliver the long-term success of the company, and to align as nearly as possible the interests of individuals, 
corporations and society Cadbury (2002). Accordingly, the main purposes of corporate governance include to: 
ensure that the board, as representatives of shareholders, protects the company’s resources and allocates them in a 
manner to meet the company’s goal; ensure that those governing and managing the company properly account to 
its stakeholders; and ensure that shareholders and other stakeholders can and do hold the board to account for their 
management and control of the company (Ofo, 2011b; Farreira, 2010; Ajagbe, et al., 2011), and  elimination or 
mitigation of conflicts of interests; and to ensure that the assets of the company are used efficiently and 
productively in the best interests of its investors and other stakeholders (CFA Institute, 2013). The National 
Corporate Governance Committee (NCGC) of Thailand provides the purpose of corporate governance is to 
establish a transparent working environment and enhance the company’s competitiveness. According to the report 
of the SEBI Committee on Corporate Governance (2003), the fundamental objective of corporate governance is to 
enhance the long-term shareholder value, while at the same time protecting the interests of other stakeholders by 
improving the corporate performance and accountability. Okereke (2013) and Sharafa (2014) identify objectives 
and significance of corporate governance to include: to ensure that those responsible for directing and controlling 
the activities of a company comply with ethical standards and relevant legislation; to restore lack of confidence 
perceived by the public as regards financial information and reporting; to fight against corruption and promote 
good labour relationship and safeguard the rights of consumers; to prevent corporate theft and fraud; to ensure 
sound internal control system. Corporate governance is developed with the primary purpose of promoting a 
transparent and efficient system that will engender the rule of law and encourage division of responsibility in a 
professional and objective manner (CBN, 2014). 
2.1.4 Core Attributes of an Effective Corporate Governance System 
Many scholars have attempted to address the question of “what drives the passion for good corporate governance.” 
According to the work of Roberts and Young (2006), the answer is in a theory about corporate behaviour and 
behind that a set of beliefs about human behaviour. It is important to understand the core qualities required within 
the frame of corporate governance system in making it effective and reliable. These attributes are by principle 
required to be binding on all persons that have explicitly consented to this corporate custom. This corporate norm 
is as such, may not be contained in any specific legal document. But both in principle and practice, “custom floats 
in the air as it were. It is there, but it is nowhere.” So, that which seems to be corporate custom lies in the corporate 
conscience. Cadbury committee report (1992), points out three key principles of corporate governance to include 
openness, integrity and accountability. Mervyn King, the Chairman, King Commission Report of 1994, pointed 
that good corporate governance is about ‘intellectual honesty’ and not just sticking to rules and regulations. The 
CFA Institute (2013) identifies five core attributes of an effective corporate governance system to include: rights, 
responsibilities, accountabilities, fairness and equitability, transparency and accuracy, protection and 
enforceability, independence and integrity. Aras and Crowther (2008) state that, in practice, there are four 
principles of good corporate governance, which are: transparency, accountability, responsibility and fairness and 
ACAG (2010) in Akharayi (2015) added participation and predictability. Corporate governance is about promoting 
corporate fairness, transparency, accountability and ethical behaviour. Accordingly, the foundation to sound 
corporate governance is the good action of the individual, which is guided by a person’s moral stance. 
Characteristics which are important in the development of an appropriate moral standard include: fairness, 
openness, independence, integrity, transparency, accountability, probity, responsibility, reputation and judgement. 
Kocourek, Burger and Birchard (2003) emphasised that simply legislating changes will not improve corporate 
governance, unless the directors possess these qualities. In the light of recent corporate governance crises and 
corporate scandals around the world, there have been calls to pay more attention to the personality and behaviour 
of company directors and managers (Baker, 2009; Young, 2009; Clarke, 2010; Kirkpatrick, 2009; and OECD, 
2009). The inappropriate behaviour of boards of directors was clearly viewed as a major contributory element to 
the corporate crisis (Okoye, 2012:1). Following the 2008 financial crisis, the United Kingdom constituted Walker 
Review Committee, which provided recommendations on the requisite behaviour of board members, and the 
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findings state that board behaviour cannot be regulated or managed through organizational structures and controls 
alone. According to Okoye (2012), this is an indication that board members may not be confined to appropriate 
behaviour merely by the institution of corporate governance structures and processes. It is in this regard that the 
Walker (2009) UK Review recommended that the assessment of board members should include among others 
evaluation of behaviour and motivation. In the United Kingdom and United States, even in Nigeria, there has been 
more focus on corporate governance structures in the recent decades and according to Okoye (2012), it is far less 
focus on the actual behaviour of the company agents who bring these structures to life. It is in recognition of the 
need for core personality quality in the board that section 4(4) of the SEC (2011) code of corporate governance 
provides that the members of the Board should be individuals with upright personal characteristics, relevant core 
competences and entrepreneurial spirit. Several examples of personality issues have been linked to corporate 
collapses, and hence White (2013), states that some observers believe that ethically responsible companies design 
and use governance mechanisms that serve all stakeholders’ interests. According to White (2013), importance of 
maintaining ethical behaviour is seen in the examples of Enron, Arthur Anderson, WorldCom, Health South and 
Tyco. In recognition of the essence of corporate ethics in developing effective corporate governance, James Joseph, 
former United States’ Ambassador to South Africa said: “Business must harness the power of ethics which is 
assuming a new level of importance, and power.” This power of ethics is wholly required to sustain corporations 
from collapsing and to keep business entities strong and viable in the course of achieving their objectives and 
desired performance. 
2.1.5 Importance of Corporate Governance 
From economic history, corporate governance is important in numerous ways: it strengthens the control structure 
of a business, which “increases accountability of management and maximizes sustainable wealth creation.” 
“Institutional investors believe that better financial performance is achieved through better management, and better 
managers pay attention to governance, hence the company is more attractive to such investors.” Good corporate 
government may cause the share price to rise – which can be referred to as the ‘corporate governance dividend.’  
Good corporate governance may cause a firm to be socially responsible. A socially responsible company may be 
more attractive to customers and investors; hence, revenues and share price may rise. Further, it is not until we 
understand how important corporate governance system is to human welfare, it will continue to sound mundane, 
even boring. “The material progress and technological breakthrough of the last two centuries, ranging from steam 
engines, cotton gins, and telegraphs, to automobiles, airplanes, and telephones, to computers, DNA splicing, and 
cell phones, would not have been possible” without the system of corporate governance in force. Efficiently 
utilizing the scarce resources of the business to yield high profitability is the system’s critical function. Corporate 
governance is concerned primarily with protecting weak and widely dispersed shareholders against self–interested 
directors and managers. It is focused on preventing corporate collapses and maximizing profitability objective of 
the firm. Good corporate governance is also germane to securing investor confidence in any corporation (Ajayi, 
2011), and for a firm to grow and develop, its governance process and structures must be well run (Akharayi, 
2015). Effective corporate governance can create safeguards against corruption and mismanagement and promote 
transparency and efficiency in economic affairs. It is at the heart of building confidence in corporate governance 
system that sustainable profitability occurs. Accordingly, effective corporate “governance structures allow 
organizations to manage their affairs with proper oversight and accountability, to create value for shareholders 
through sound investment and innovation, and provide control systems commensurate with the risks involved.” 
Ganiyu and Abiodun (2012) identify corporate governance as a tool for socio-economic development. Good 
corporate governance will ultimately lead to reduction in the incidence of corporate failures, poor internal control 
system, poor corporate structure, indiscipline both on the part of management and workers (Ganiyu and Abiodun, 
2012). Good corporate governance can enhance investor trust, attract outside investment, and demonstrate a 
country’s commitment to observing international standards (Oteh, 2013). While good corporate governance will 
ultimately contribute to sustainable economic development by enhancing the performance of companies and 
increasing their access to global capital, poor corporate governance tends to weaken a company’s potential and 
may lead to financial difficulties and even fraud (Oteh, 2013:19). Poorly governed corporations do not only pose 
a risk to themselves, they do to others and could indeed pull down capital market Ganiyu and Abiodun (2012). 
Poor corporate governance was identified as one of the major factors in virtually all known instances of firm’s 
distress in the country (Ajayi, 2009). Oteh (2013), states that capital is attracted by returns as much as good 
corporate governance and best practice. In other words, if there is a lack of good corporate governance in a market, 
capital will leave that market (King I Report, 1994; Levitt, 1998; Oteh, 2013). Good corporate governance is a 
scientific way of generating a competitive and reasonable return on investment for the shareholders. 
Evidence suggests that companies with strong governance had greater investment performance. 
Researchers have shown that improving a company’s corporate governance has proportionately greater impact on 
countries with weak legal environments. Also, they suggested that companies can partially compensate for 
ineffective laws and enforcement by establishing good corporate governance at the company level and providing 
credible investor protection. White (2013) posits that effective corporate governance is of interest to nations as it 
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reflects societal standards. Accordingly, how nations choose to govern their corporations affects firm’s investment 
decisions; firms seek to invest in nations with national governance standards that are acceptable. Ekineh (2009) 
contends that “irrespective of how sound macro – economic policies are, if entities are not well governed the macro 
– economic objectives may not be attained. Recent domestic and global happenings attest to this and have further 
reinforced the importance of good corporate governance.” Levitt (1999) affirmed that corporate governance is 
‘indispensable to effective market discipline.’ Oteh (2013) argued that capital is attracted by returns as much as 
good corporate governance and best practice. If there is a lack of good corporate governance in a market, capital 
will leave that market with the click of a mouse. Levitt (2000) succinctly articulated that: “if a country does not 
have a reputation for strong corporate governance practices, capital will flow elsewhere. If investors are not 
confident with the level of disclosure, capital will flow elsewhere. If a country opts for lax accounting and reporting 
standards, capital will flow elsewhere. All enterprises in that country – regardless of how steadfast a particular 
company’s practices may be – suffer the consequences.” Norwani, et al, (2011) added that good corporate 
governance is aimed at enhancing business prosperity and corporate accountability with the ultimate objective of 
realizing long-term shareholders value. Panfilii and Popa (2012) contend that good corporate governance can 
remove mistrust between different stakeholders, reduce cost of capital and improve performance, and to prevent 
earnings manipulation and fraud (Cohen, et al, 2004) and Mervyn King, in King Commission (1994) report added 
that capital flowed towards companies that practiced this type of good governance and will be conform while it 
performs.  
In their research work, Ganiyu and Abiodun (2012) believe that corporate governance if properly and 
efficiently put in place can greatly assist the food and beverages sector by infusing better management principle, 
effective control and accounting systems, stringent monitoring, effective regulatory mechanism and efficient 
utilization of firm’s resources resulting in improved performance. The corporate governance of food and beverages 
firms in Nigeria is important for several reasons. First, food and beverage sector has an overwhelmingly dominant 
position in the non – financial systems of Nigeria, and are extremely crucial engines of economic growth, and 
providing the basic needs of the economy. Second, the sector is one of the most important sources of utilizing the 
produces from the primary industry and it involves interdisciplinary industry. It links many other sectors of the 
economy together. Third, the industry is the main use of the finance from local and foreign capital markets thereby 
helping to enhance the robustness of the capital market activities. Fourth, it provides the source of feeding the 
nation at large. Given the importance of food and beverages firms, their governance now assumes a central role in 
increasing profitability. There is a substantial evidence to show the positive correlation between the development 
of food and beverages sector, economic growth and poverty reduction. The recent increase in the nation’s GDP is 
due to rapid increase in this sector. The Nigerian food and beverages firms therefore have a significant role to play 
in the development of the country’s economy. Effective corporate governance practices are essential to restoring 
public trust and confidence in the sector. This is as weak corporate governance may contribute to food and 
beverages firms’ failure, lead to a run in the sector and bequeath massive unemployment, cause hardship and 
starvation, inflation and several other negative impacts on the economy. 
 
2.2.0 Elements of Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance as a global phenomenon has many universal characteristics. This study concentrated on four 
board characteristics: size of board of directors, board composition, board skills and competence and board 
diversity as the independent variables.  
2.2.1 Board Size 
The extant literature has identified size of board of directors as one of the characteristics of corporate governance. 
Board size refers to the total number of directors on the board of any corporate organization (Dozie, 2003; 
Ogbechie and Koufopoulos, 2010:6). Determining the ideal board size for an organization is very important 
because the number and quality of directors in a firm determine and influence the board functioning and corporate 
profitability (Ogbechie and Koufopoulos, 2010). Dabor, et al. (2015), posit that there is no agreed number of 
members that make up an ideal board size. According to them, there have been diverging opinions by various 
investigators on the number of persons that should make up an ideal board size. Tornyeva and Wereko (2012) 
confirm that the pending issue is on how to determine an optimal board size since companies have different needs 
and several factors are considered before appointing any person as a director on the board of a company; these 
factors according to them include issues of the diversity of the company’s operations, skills requirement, 
shareholding structure, regulatory requirements, and size of the company; also, nature, size and complexity of the 
enterprise as well as its stage of development (Okereke, 2013). In determining board size, Lipton and Lorsch (1992) 
recommend a number of board members to be between eight and nine. Jensen (1993) argues for seven or eight 
members; Brown and Caylor (2004) suggested a board size of between 6 and 15 members; Tornyeva and Wereko 
(2012) support an ideal board size of 7 and 9. Tanko and Kolawole (2007) recommend about 10 to 15 board 
members for a firm that is averagely large. Section 246(1) of the Companies and Allied Matters Act, CAMA 1990 
provides that every registered company shall have at least two (2) directors. However, this section does not take 
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cognizance of the minimum number of directors required to register and operate a public liability company, which 
is presently the focus of corporate governance. Section 4.2 of 2011 SEC code on corporate governance in Nigeria 
provides that membership of the board should not be less than five (5). While section 5.6 of the exposure draft of 
2015 National Code of Corporate Governance increases the minimum number of board size to eight (8).  
Meanwhile, section 4.1 of the 2011 Code and Section 5.1 of the Exposure Draft of 2015 NCCG in Nigeria 
emphasize that the Board membership should be of a sufficient size relative to the scale and complexity of the 
company’s operations and such that cannot compromise availability of members to attend meetings. A board of 
directors should not be too large or too small in number in a way as to distort the company’s operating performance. 
Therefore, board size should be considerable as it influences the overall performance of a firm. Hence, it would 
be optimal to have a board size of between 7 and 10 members to ensure efficiency of operations, diversity of skills, 
and improved performance. 
Some school of thoughts are of the view that a small board size is more effective because it enhances fast 
decision making and cannot be manipulated by management (John and Senbet, 1998; Dalton, et al; 1999; Dozie, 
2003; Dabor, et al; 2015). According to John and Senbet (1998), large boards are less effective and are easily 
controlled by the CEO. Further, they argue that when a board gets too big, it becomes difficult to coordinate and 
for it to process and tackle strategic problems of the organization. Dalton, et al. (1999) posit that a large board is 
overcrowded and hence does not give room for each member’s input; it is also less organized and unable to reach 
a decisive conclusion on time. Also, Dozie (2003) argues that a smaller board may be less encumbered with 
bureaucratic problems, more able to provide better financial reporting oversight. Dabor, et al. (2015), identify 
some of the disadvantages associated with a large board to include high cost of coordination and delay in passing 
information as well as weak monitoring. Larger board may also serve as a breeding place for incompetent directors 
to hide and it encourages multiple directorship phenomena. As a result, some of the directors may not be able to 
justify the huge sum of remunerations they receive. Large board size could also be identified with loss of passion 
and commitment to service. Ganiyu and Abiodun (2012) have argued that larger board membership could result 
in difficulty in arriving at a consensus in decision making and this has the tendency of weakening corporate 
governance effectiveness. According to Tornyeva and Wereko (2012), larger boards may experience agency and 
free – rider problem. Agency problem increases with board size because of more conflicting groups representing 
their own diverse interests; also free – riding increases as some directors neglect their monitoring and controlling 
duties to other directors on the board (Nanka – Brune, 2009:32; Tanko and Kolawole, 2007). Lipton and Lorsch 
(1992) and Jensen (1993) posit that large boards are less effective and are easier for a CEO to control. According 
to them, when a board gets too big, it becomes difficult to coordinate and becomes problematic especially in terms 
of the process involves in decision making and agency cost will increase, thereby reducing the operating efficiency 
and positive performance of firms. It has further been argued that larger boards have larger financial cost 
implication since they consume more pecuniary and non – pecuniary company resources in the form of 
remuneration and perquisites than small boards (Gyakari, 2009:98); and very prone to fictionalizations and 
coalitions that will delay strategic decision making processes (Forbes and Milliken, 1999). Yermack (1996) has 
argued that coordination, communication and decision – making problems increasingly impede company 
performance when the number of directors increases. The empirical studies of Yermack (1996); Eisenberg, et al, 
(1998); and Mak and Yuanto (2003), Aljifri and Moustafa (2007), support for small board size. In addition, 
Kyereboah – Coleman and Biekpe (2005) in Tanko and Kolawole (2007) found that small board sizes enhance the 
performance of firms quoted on the stock exchange. These views however, portray the boards as a burden to the 
organization rather than as a reservoir of intellectualism, source of capital, and embodiment of skills and diversified 
managerial experience that its large number is required to maximizing corporate value and improving the wellbeing 
of all groups. According to Forbes and Milliken (1999), large board size provides an increase pool of expertise 
because larger boards are likely to have more knowledge and skills at their disposal to make better decisions. They 
are also capable of reducing the dominance of an overbearing CEO to dominate and hence put the necessary checks 
and balances. Jensen (1993) points out that board’s monitoring and supervising capacity is increased as more and 
more directors join the board. Further it helps to provide sufficient number of board committees that serve as the 
thinking tank of the entire boards and facilitates quick and encompassing strategic decision – making process. 
Large boards could provide the diversity that would help companies to secure critical resources and reduce 
environmental uncertainties (Pfeffer, 1983; Pearce and Zahra, 1992; Goodstein, et al., 1994). Thus, as an extra 
member is included in the board, a potential trade – off exists between diversity and coordination (Uadiale, 2010). 
From resource dependency perspective, Marlin and Geifer (2012) have argued that larger board size may increase 
the number of external linkages and thus increase the potential for securing needed resources. Borokhovich, et al. 
(2005) and Miller (2009) affirm that prior research suggests that larger boards may increase monitoring strength 
as well as reduce the potential for domination by the powerful CEO (Singh and Harianto, 1989). Larger board size 
facilitates director independence. According to Pearce and Zahra (1992), larger boards provide better access to 
their firm’s external environment, risk reduction and acquisition of critical organizational resources needed for 
firm performance. This is because the directors are expected to be an important link between the company and 
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their networks. Yawson (2006) posits that because of the diversity of the directors of larger boards it enhances the 
knowledge base of the companies. More so, Berger, et al. (1997) found that companies with larger board 
membership have low leverage. Accordingly, they assume that larger board size translates into strong pressure 
from the corporate board to make managers pursue low debt ratio. The preponderance is that with larger board 
size, there will be lower payment of interest expense resulting to lower operating expense and higher profitability 
than where the board size is smaller. Uadiale (2010) study reveals that large board size performs effectively and 
therefore recommends the encouragement of large board size in Nigerian firms to enhance financial performance. 
Dehaene, et al. (2001) finding shows that large boards should be encouraged. Nonetheless, a further review of the 
empirical results on the impact of board size on performance show mixed conclusions. The findings of Haniffa, et 
al. (2006), show inconclusive results of the impact of board size on firm performance.  
2.2.2 Board Composition 
Board composition refers to the number of independent non-executive directors on the board relative to the total 
number of directors (Uadiale, 2010). It is the proportion of those directors serving on the board who do not hold 
management positions in the company. Board composition is the ratio of non-executive and independent non-
executive directors or outside directors to the overall board size. Goergen and Renneboog (2000) refer to it as the 
distinction between inside and outside directors. According to them, it is traditionally shown as the percentage of 
outside directors serving on the board. It is important to note that there is no clear conclusion on what should be 
the optimal board composition. Section 4.1 of 2011 Code of Corporate Governance in Nigeria states that the board 
should be composed in such a way as to ensure diversity of experience without compromising independence of 
members, and section 4.3 of the code adds that the board should comprise a mix of executive and non-executive 
directors, headed by a chairman, who shall be a non-executive director. The majority of board members shall be 
non-executive directors, at least one of whom should be an independent director. This provision implies that a 
board of directors should consist of three categories of members: Executive director, non-executive director and 
independent non-executive director. This means that the larger proportion of the directors serving on the board 
should be non-executive directors. Considering the minimum requirement of five (5) board members and at least 
one (1) independent non-executive director in 2011 code, it suggests a board composition of non-executive and 
independent directors to executive directors – factor of 4:1. This indicates that 80% of the board size should be the 
maximum of the board composition. The aftermath of the board composition is that there should be a higher 
number of non-executive directors in the board membership if the corporate governance practice of firms is to be 
effective and seen as being effective. Further, section 5.4 of the Exposure Draft of 2015 NCCG in Nigeria provides 
that the number of executive directors on the board should not be more than one-third of the board. Section 5.5 
adds that the number of non-executive directors on the board should not be less than two-thirds of the board and 
the number of independent non-executive directors should not be less than half of the number of non-executive 
directors. This provides the board composition of non-executive and independent non-executive directors to 
executive directors - ratio of 7:2. This indicates that 77.78% of the board size should be the maximum of the board 
composition. The provision is plausible to conclude that larger number of the directors is expected to be outside 
directors; making the larger the board, the larger the board composition. In order to realize the benefit of board 
composition, section 6.6.1 of 2015 of NCCG provides that non-executive directors should be chosen on the basis 
of their wide experience, specialist knowledge and personal qualities and are expected to bring these qualities to 
bear on issues of strategy, performance and resources. More so, section 6.6.2 provides that non-executive directors 
should constructively challenge and contribute to the development of the strategy of the company and satisfy 
themselves that the financial information provided by the company is accurate and that the company has in place 
a robust and adequate internal control and risk management systems. Further, John and Senbet (1988) posit that 
boards of directors are more independent if they have more non-executive directors. As to whether the presence 
of non-executive directors on the board will relatively impact on the firm’s performance, according to Higgs (2003) 
is largely invisible and poorly understood. According to the studies conducted by Korn/Ferry and Egan (2002; 
2005; 2005), there is an increasing trend to have a majority of non-executive directors on the boards. Their findings 
suggest that this trend to appoint more non-executive directors than executive directors is a factor of almost 3:1. 
Also in Nigeria, the ratio of non-executive directors to executive directors on the board has increased remarkably 
since the introduction of 2003 code of corporate governance for public companies in Nigeria by SEC; and this is 
a factor of almost 4:1. Although, Fama and Jensen (1983); Banysinger and Hoskinsson (1990) and Hermalin and 
Weisbach (2002) have argued that the effectiveness of a board depends on the optimal mix of inside and outside 
directors, there is very little theory on the determinant of an optimal board composition. Although inside and 
outside directors have their respective advantages and disadvantages, there is an apparent presumption that boards 
with significant outside directors or non-executive directors will make different and perhaps better decision than 
board dominated by insiders or executive directors.  Pablo, et al., (2005) also confirm that many authors favour 
outside dominated boards. According to Fama and Jensen (1983), independent directors are incentives to scrutinize 
diligently, because they seek to protect their reputation as effective monitors of managerial discretion. Since they 
are in a better position to discipline management, independent directors are arguably more effective in prohibiting 
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opportunistic behaviour, thereby reducing potential agency conflicts (Bhagat and Black, 2000; Siladi, 2006). Fama 
and Jensen (1983) and Baysinger and Butler (1985) emphasize that outside directors can increase the element of 
independence and objectivity in board’s strategic decision-making, and also help in providing independent 
supervision of the company’s management, hence making board’s oversight function more effective and 
productive. Scherrer (2003) and Scarborough, et al. (2010) argue that outside directors, in addition to providing 
valuable access to resources and information, also protect shareholders’ interests since they do not have the same 
concern with their employment or advancement opportunities. Lorsch (1995) and Scarborough, et al. (2010) argue 
that since the non-executive directors are not involved in the operational activities of company, they would avoid 
issues of unresolved conflicts of interest and are in a position to look at issues objectively and this would help 
improve performance. From resource dependence perspective, Hillman, Cannellas and Harris (2002) opine that 
the resource-dependence role of directors suggests board composition will impact external linkages to the firm’s 
environment. According to Scarborough, et al. (2010), independent boards promote board activism because the 
directors would be able to challenge and criticise the decisions of the management. These objective criticisms 
ensure that management is taking the right decisions in the interest of stakeholders which translate into better 
performance (Tornyeva and Wereko, 2012). Fama (1980) posits that outside may act as ‘professional referees to 
ensure that completion among insiders stimulates actions consistent with shareholder value maximization. Roberts 
et al. (2005), posit that board effectiveness is related to the degree to which non-executives acting individually and 
collectively are able to create accountability within the board in relation to both strategy and performance. 
However, there are some other theoretical and empirical evidences that are not in support of increase in 
the board composition of a company. Siladi (2006) points out that a criticism of non-executive directors is that 
they are too busy with other commitments and are only involved with the company business on a “part-time” basis. 
It has also been observed that the average director spends only twenty-two days per year on his duties; this is 
barely enough to perform the essential functions, indeed it may be wandered whether the directors who put in less 
than average effort can be discharging their duties adequately (Bosch, 1995: 106). Since the average director 
spends a little more than two weeks a year on the job, it is difficult to develop much more than a rudimentary 
understanding of their companies’ workings (Carter and Lorsch, 2004:45). It has also been argued that inside 
directors are more familiar with the firm’s activities and they can act as monitors to top management if they 
perceive the opportunity to advance into positions held by incompetent executives. Further, Siladi ((2006) observes 
that non-executive directors do not necessarily have a “hands - on” approach, or are not necessarily well versed in 
the business, hence do not necessarily make the best decisions; and argues that “a balanced board” is considered 
desirable. More so, independent non-executive directors may be operating on the basis of stereotypes and 
generalization due to they are always coming from outside. They will prefer the outsider’s view to the insider; 
consequently act on stereotypes, generalization, even on unconscious bias. These attitudes will reduce their 
operational efficiency, strategic actions and obviously decline the firm profitability. According to Tornyeva and 
Wereko (2012), non-executive directors may not have total commitment to the cause of the company because of 
other commitments and consequently may not be on top of issues affecting the company and this would limit their 
contribution to performance of the company. White (2013) has argued that large number of non-executive directors 
can create problems of limited contact with firm’s day-to-day operations and incomplete information about 
mangers. This will result ineffective assessments of managerial decisions and initiatives. Baysinger and Hoskisson 
(1990) clearly point that non-executive directors are limited in scope and understanding when it comes to 
complexities involve in decision making because of their temporal position. It has also been argued that outside 
dominated boards are merely mechanism to orchestrate agency theory objective of maximizing shareholder value 
instead of encouraging for a balanced value sharing of stakeholder theory. While many conceptual evidences show 
that larger proportion of non-executive directors on boards will enhance the firm profitability, however, the 
findings from some empirical studies are showing mixed and inconclusive results. According to Oluwafemi, et al. 
(2013), there is overwhelming empirical evidence on the positive role played by outside directors in board’s 
monitoring and control function. Weisbach (1988) conducted a research to know whether monitoring management 
in company with outsider dominated board is more effective than for companies with insider – dominated board, 
and found that the composition of the board is what determined the level of monitoring the CEO. Dehaene, et al. 
(2001), find that the percentage of outside directors is positively related to the performance of Belgian firms. 
Connelly and Limpaphayon (2004) conclude that board composition has a positive relation with profitability of 
firms in Thailand. Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) find a positive stock price reaction at the announcement of the 
appointment of an additional outside director, implying that the proportion of outside director, affects shareholders’ 
wealth. O’Sullivan (2000) finding from a sample of 402 UK listed companies suggests that non-executive directors 
encourage more intensive audits as a complement to their own monitoring role while the reduction in agency costs 
is expected. The study conducted in Nigeria by Uadiale (2010) reveals a positive association between outside 
directors sitting on the board and corporate financial performance. 
In contrast, there is also a fair amount of empirical results that tend not to support this positive relationship 
between board composition and profitability (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Conyon and Peck, 1998; Ezzamel
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Watson, 2002; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). Some of them report a negative and statistically significant relationship 
with Tobin’s Q (Agrawal and Knoeder, 1996; Yermack, 1996). While some other findings show that the proportion 
of non-executive directors on the board has no significant impact on the financial performance measures (Vafeas 
and Theodorou, 1998; Weir, Laing and McKnight, 2002; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). In Tanko and Kolawole 
(2007), Dalton, et al. (1998) study indicates that board composition has a negative correlation with firm 
performance indicators. Further, based on a large survey of firms with non-executive directors in the Netherlands, 
Hooghiemstra and Van Manen (2004) conclude that stakeholders are not generally satisfied with the way non-
executives operate. Haniffa, et al. (2006) identify that high proportion of non-executive directors may engulf the 
company in excessive monitoring, be harmful to companies as they may stifle strategic actions, lack real 
independence, and lack the business knowledge to be truly effective. Nonetheless, some other researchers could 
not reach conclusion of the relationship between board composition and firm profitability (Kanng and Shivdasani, 
1995; Kesner, 1987; Dalton, et al, 1998).  
2.2.3 Board Skills and Competence 
Boards require a high degree of specialized knowledge and skills to function effectively. Of the several 
characteristics evolved for ensuring good corporate governance, the skills and competences of the board of 
directors remain prominent in developing corporate conscience and core value. Therefore, board skills and 
competence is one of the pillars for enhancing board effectiveness. It means the ability to conduct board activities 
for which a director was trained and inducted as prescribed in the code of corporate governance.  According to 
Ogbechie and Koufopoulos (2010), the knowledge and skills most relevant to boards are in two dimensions: 
functional area knowledge and skills and firm–specific knowledge and skills. According to them, functional area 
knowledge and skills include accounting, finance, marketing, and law. In addition to these, administration 
knowledge is necessary. Board members can either possess these skills or have access to external networks that 
can provide them. In this view, firm–specific knowledge and skills refer to detailed information about the firm and 
an intimate understanding of its operations and internal management issues. Nonaka (1994) posits that boards often 
need this kind of ‘tacit’ knowledge in order to deal effectively with strategic issues. Issues of corporate governance 
need corporate skills and knowledge to achieve a result. In this regard, if boards are to perform their service tasks 
effectively, they must be able to combine their knowledge of various functional areas and apply that knowledge 
properly to firm–specific issues. 
A growing interest in board competence is not surprising. In fact, ample evidence of corporate failures 
strongly suggests a compelling need for it. Failures of corporate entities worldwide have caused organizations to 
focus a spotlight on boards and the way they carry out their oversight function and prompted a variety of reform 
and mandates aimed at improving board performance and accountability. Tornyeva and Wereko (2012) have traced 
several corporate failures to the inability of boards to identify the problems early enough because they lack the 
requisite skills. According to Coulson –Thomas (2007) if boards are to add more value, make a greater contribution 
to corporate growth and create a better tomorrow, they may need to challenge conventional thinking and question 
current practices, and this can only be possible when the board acquired the necessary skills and expertise needed 
to provide and communicate clear direction, a distinctive vision, compelling purpose, achievable goals and clear 
objectives. Board is a critical asset for every organization and the need for the governing boards to be informed, 
engaged, and effective has potentially never been greater; as such, increasing competition for resources, greater 
complexity and sophistication, and the potential of external regulation drive the need for high quality board 
members (Brown, 2005). 
Despite greater clarity about factors that contribute to better board performance, many firms’ directors 
are often appointed without a clear understanding of the job they are supposed to perform and without receiving 
any written information about their roles, responsibilities. When boards of directors are not empowered to do their 
jobs, it is the corporation that will suffer by the way of corporation collapse. Small (2000) notes that many directors 
are generally asked to serve for their influence or affluence rather than on the basis of predetermined competencies. 
Consequently, “many boards are made up of very bright, able people whose skills and experience do not match up 
with the board’s needs.” In these cases, the board turns out to be a whole that is less than the sum of its parts; as 
such, the boards should, in fact, be competency – based (small, 2000). According to Okereke (2013), the board 
having directors with relevant business and industry experience is beneficial to the board as a whole. “Phil Cooke 
says: ‘One of the most damaging sacred cows in organizations is basing employee status on seniority rather than 
talent. Yes, loyalty is important, but some of the most loyal employees are loyal because of selfishness. They 
project loyalty to keep their jobs, retain their benefits, or hold on to their authority. Real loyalty is about innovation, 
original thinking and helping the company to get to the next level.’” Thus, what underlies the doctrine of corporate 
opportunity is transparency of directors and top management teams. In their business conduct, they must not only 
be above board and absolutely loyal to the common cause, they should pride themselves in the quantum of honesty 
and integrity they exhibit in all their business dealings (Asein, 2014:20). Section 4.4 of 2011 SEC Code of 
Corporate Governance in Nigeria contains that the members of the board should be individuals with upright 
personal characteristics, relevant core competences and entrepreneurial spirit. Accordingly, the board of directors 
Industrial Engineering Letters                                                                                                                                                            www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-6096 (Paper) ISSN 2225-0581 (online) 
Vol.6, No.3, 2016 
 
58 
should have a record of tangible achievement and should be knowledgeable in board matters as well as possess 
the sense of accountability, integrity and be committed to the task of good corporate governance. However, 2011 
SEC corporate governance code and Exposure Draft of 2015 NCCG Code of Corporate Governance could not 
define the minimum educational qualification, skills, knowledge and experience required as a criterion for 
membership of board of directors.  
2.2.4 Board Diversity 
For boards to be effective, there is need for diverse perspectives in the board to confront the thinking of 
management (Ogbechie and Koufopoulos, 1997:8), and hence the demand for board diversity. By board diversity, 
it means inclusion of persons with different acceptable characters in the board size. According to Vander, Walt 
and Ingley (2003), diversity in the context of corporate governance is the composition of the board and the 
combination of the different qualities, characteristics and expertise of the individual members in relation to 
decision-making and other processes within the board. Decenzo and Robbins (2005) posit that board diversity 
depicts the varied personal characteristics that make the workforce heterogeneous. It explains the situation where 
the board composition is made up of individuals with varied skills and disciplines, culture, age, managerial 
experience, gender, ethnicity and other diverse characteristics that would make the board a complete reservoir of 
human resources. Coffey and Wang (1998) include functional background, professional experiences, and 
education; while Forbes and Milliken (1999) added outside board representation and the number of boards in 
which directors serve (Marlin and Geiger, 2012). The essence of board diversity is to have a complete set of 
different traits as a “brain bank” of a company. So, board diversity can be referred to as those varied personal 
characteristics and physical differences in people who are members of the board that make the board heterogeneous 
(Ogbechie and Koufopoulos, 1997:8). Diversity has been identified as a fundamental governance issue, which has 
the capacity to influence corporate performance. Society for Corporate Governance Nigeria, SCGN (2014) 
observes that corporations are increasingly under pressure to ensure diversity within their boardrooms. It has also 
been argued that many failures in corporate governance practices which in turn contributed to significant low 
profitability and investor losses were bolstered by the observation that board composition remains highly 
homogenous and geared towards “group think” and an inability to effectively rein in management and oversee risk. 
According to Eisenhardt and Bourgeosis (1998); Kosnik (1990) and Kosnik (1990), the promotion of diverse 
perspectives in a board can generate a wider range of solutions and decision criteria for strategic decisions. When 
the diversity within the company and its management reflects the diversity within the relevant market, a company 
is better able to serve and retain that market (Carter, et al. 2013; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Zandstra (2002) 
asserts that the board should be a group of people who are prepared to speak up and ask difficult questions. They 
should also be prepared to differ, respect other’s views and opinions and talk through them (Kakabadse, et al, 2001; 
Cutting and Kouzmin, 2002; Dixon and Dogan, 2003). Companies with a higher degree of diversity on the board 
also give an important signal to potential employees of that company; society regards a higher degree of diversity 
as positive, and the reputation of the company improves (Luckerath – Rover, 2011). Board diversity is, 
unsurprisingly, a very hot topic in academic research as well (Ferreira, 2010; Broome, et al, 2011; Dobbin and 
Jung, 2011). Valsan (2013) opines that, in all advanced societies of today, it is unacceptable to doubt the value of 
diversity, and rightfully so. Because of the unique characteristics of diversity in corporate governance, a number 
of countries have introduced legislation imposing gender quotas for boards publicly quoted companies. In Nigeria, 
for instance, the 2011 SEC Corporate Governance Code recommends that the criteria for the selection of directors 
shall reflect gender composition. Following the recent demand for gender inclusiveness in boardroom in several 
countries, this research work focuses the measurement of board diversity only on gender diversity among other 
characteristics of board diversity. This is because gender is the easiest distinguished demographic characteristic 
compared with age, nationality, education or cultural backgrounds (Luckerath – Rovers, 2011); the most discussed 
characteristic of board diversity in recent time and has attracted global attention. More so, the choices of gender 
diversity was formed on submission to the debate that women directors have a greater “other-orientation” and 
hence are more committed to the development of stakeholder relationships and the long-term firm value 
(Langervoort, 2011). Women have unique characteristics and resources needed to to improve the board dynamic, 
positively influence the strategic direction of a corporation and contribute to the growth of firms (Ijas, 2012; SCGN, 
2014). Various writers have therefore suggested that having women in top management can result in higher 
earnings, greater shareholder wealth and better corporate governance and increased competitiveness (SCGN, 2014). 
Luckerath-Rovers (2011), opines that the presence of women might improve team performance and reach better 
decisions; which could ultimately lead to higher business value and business performance (Carter, et al. 2003). 
In spite of this, available evidence suggests that women are underrepresented in senior executive and 
board positions. SCGN (2014) notes that socio-cultural traditions tend to inhibit women from attaining these 
corporate levels in many parts of African countries, and in recent decades, Board of Directors around the world 
are overwhelmingly comprised of male gender, and only a small percentage of female directors have emerged 
despite the extraordinary gains of women in the workplace. Even in Nigeria, it has been observed that Nigerian 
women are poorly represented in corporate boardrooms. Consequently, companies that fail to draw from the ever 
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deepening talent pool of well–educated and high achieving women will fall behind in an increasingly competitive 
world (SCGN, 2014). In order to achieve the objective of seeing more women recruited to boardroom positions, 
quoted companies should be required to disclose each year the proportion of women on the board, women in senior 
executive positions and female employees in the whole organizations (SCGN, 2014). Due to their different values 
and moral orientation, women are generally more corporate governance–oriented, “which may also influence 
companies’ performance in non-financial areas.” It has also been observed that the impact of female board 
members depends on the nature of the tasks performed. Luckerath-Rovers (2011) results show that firms with 
women directors perform better than those without women on their boards. As such, Ijas (2012) points that, 
corporations have been criticised for the low level of female members on their boards. 
Gender diversity on the board is supported by different theoretical perspective (Dabor, et al, 2015). 
Agency theory which is concerned mainly about monitoring role of the boards requires diversified resources from 
both female and male genders to carry out board strategic direction and control. Representation from diverse 
groups will provide a balanced board so that no individual or group of individuals can dominate the decision-
making of the board (Erhardt, et al, 2003). The management may be less able to manipulate a more heterogeneous 
board to achieve their personal interests at the expense of the firm, and the oversight function may be more effective 
if there is gender diversity on the board which allows for a broader range of opinions to be considered (Dabor, et 
al, 2015). From stakeholder theory, diversity also provides representation of varying interest groups of the firm 
for equity and fairness (Dabor, et al, 2015). From the stewardship view, the board is an embodiment of responsible, 
transparent and accountable men and women. In order to reduce conflict of interest, strike a balance between the 
owners and the management for achieving goal congruence, board diversity is promoted. From the value – synergy 
approach, boards should comprise of men and women who have regards for each other value, and according to 
this view, board diversity influences behaviour of employees intrinsically and leaves them with the sense of 
collective responsibility and belongingness which boosts their impulse for higher commitment and performance. 
From political theory, the board is a representation of the various social, legal, economic and political environments 
and these factors make up the society. The society thus admires any organization with board diversity and sees 
such as being socially responsible organization and with the scent of democratic wing to direct appropriately the 
affairs of the firm which enjoys from the political tune of the environment. Board diversity in the direction of 
resource dependency theory sees the board as a source of resources; hence, the resources seem to add better result 
when they are in the form of heterogeneity. Also, the board is seen as a strategic resource, which provides a 
connection to different external resources (Walt and Ingley, 2003). Hillman, et al. (2007) investigated how boards 
of directors serve as a linkage instrument and under which organizational characteristics gender diversity is most 
valuable. By recruiting female directors, companies may provide these benefits from linking with their 
stakeholders (Luckerath – Rovers, 2011). 
However, Broome, et al. (2011) write that a recent study has shown that, despite showing an almost 
universal assent to the value of diversity in abstractor, corporate directors and officers have difficulty providing 
specific concrete examples of instances or ways in which diversity adds value to their boards; some empirical 
results are mixed and inconclusive (Valsan, 2010). In New Zealand, Bathula (2008) empirical study reveals that 
gender diversity was positively related with firm performance. Using Dutch listed companies both with and 
without women on their boards, Luckerath – Rovers (2011) results show that, firms with women directors perform 
better than those without women on their boards. Erhardt, et al, (2003) empirical research results indicate that 
board gender diversity has a positive linkage with firm financial performance. In Denmark, Rose (2007) 
investigation of the impact of female board representation on financial performance of selected quoted Danish 
companies found that gender diversity does have significant impact on firm financial performance. Empirical 
evidence shows that gender diversity on boards is not only an ethical obligation, but also seems to have a positive 
effect on firm performance (Ijas, 2012:2). The study by consultancy firm McKinsey (2007) and Catalyst (2007), a 
non-profit organization is consistent with the positive relationship of gender diversity and firm performance. Carter, 
et al. (2003) investigation of relationship between Tobin’s Q and the presence of women in the boards of the 
fortune 1,000 companies found a statistically significant positive relationship. On the other hand, Rose (2007) 
could not establish any relationship between board diversity and Tobin’s Q. 
2.2.5 Other Factors Affecting Profitability of Firms  
Previous studies have shown that having effective corporate governance in place does not always translate into 
high firm profitability. Suffice it to say that, a firm may demonstrate good corporate governance, but still has low 
profitability level. The implication is that there may be other factors different from corporate governance 
characteristics which could influence profitability of firms. Liargovas and Skandalis (2010) confirm that there are 
still hectic debates about what the best numbers of factors that affect profitability of firms are. Tailab (2014) 
identifies that several internal factors play an important role directly or indirectly in determining profitability. 
These other determinants of firm profitability may include: leverage, liquidity, inventory, firm growth, firm age 
and firm size (in terms of either volume of sales or total assets). However this study could not have accommodated 
all these factors as control variables. Following availability of data and robustness of the results, firm’s size in 
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terms of total assets is considered as the control variable of this research work. Firm size could be measured both 
in terms of total assets and in terms of total sales. It is considered as a fundamental variable that influences firm 
profitability (Nunes and Serresaueiro, 2008). According to Tailab (2014), despite the fact that the interest of 
analysing firm size lies in size’s effect on profitability, a hectic debate still exists as to whether large companies 
have more opportunity than small firms to enhance their profitability by taking advantage of economies of scale. 
In this regard, Goddard, Tavakoli, and Wilson (2005) found that a firm’s size had a negative relationship with 
profitability. A study conducted by Nunes and Serrasqueiro (2008) showed evidence of insignificance relationship 
between firm size and profitability in large Portuguese firms, while confirmed that in small and medium firms, 
firm size had a positive and significant correlation with profitability. A study by Okougbo (2011) shows that 
company size measured on the basis of net book value of assets is found to be positively associated with 
performance. This suggests that the greater the company size, the greater the firm profitability. Thus, larger firms 
are most likely to perform better than their competing smaller counterparts because they are open to greater 
windows of investment and production opportunity. In another development, Lee (2009) confirmed that the rate 
of profitability had a positive relationship with firm size of United States public companies. Similarly, Omondi 
and Muturi (2013) found a significant positive correlation between financial performance and firm size of listed 
companies in Nairobi. These findings were consistent with Babalola (2013), who studied the impact of firm size, 
both in terms of total assets and in terms of total sales and found that, firm size had a positive influence on 
profitability. 
 
2.5.0 Regulatory Framework of Corporate Governance in Nigeria 
Ever since corporate governance ‘has become the heart-beat of world economies’, almost all the developed 
countries and the developing economies have enacted one regulatory framework or the other concerning it 
(Nwonyuku, 2012a).  These regulations according to Nwonyuku (2012a) are reflections of global trends 
emphasizing regulatory compliance and improved disclosure in the wake of significant destruction of shareholders 
value through a failure to adopt sound corporate governance practices.’ Policymakers and regulators alike 
recognised the need for a body of rules and practices that will reconcile the interests of shareholders, management 
and the board of directors of corporations following the agency problem that led to continuous collapse of 
companies. This is considered since regulation is one proven way to provoke behavioural change; governments, 
policymakers and regulators around the world have devoted significant time and resources to the development of 
legislation and policies related to corporate governance.  According to Ganiyu and Abiodun (2012), poorly 
governed corporations do not only pose a risk to themselves, they do to others and could indeed pull down capital 
market. This means, poor governance of a firm would pose a threat to the entire economy. More so, irrespective 
of how sound macroeconomic policies are if business entities are not well governed, the macro-economic 
objectives may not be attained (Ganiyu and Abiodun, 2012). OECD (2004) identifies good corporate governance 
as being capable to contribute growth and financial stability by underpinning market confidence, financial market 
integrity and economic efficiency. Good corporate governance is feasible through effective regulations and 
legislations. In Nigeria, the first attempt to provide a code of best practices for public companies was through the 
Code of Corporate Governance for Public Companies 2003 to supplement the existing legal framework of 
corporate governance principles, particularly the Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) and the Investment 
and Securities Act (Ajayi, 2011). And subsequently, other corporate governance codes surface in both industry – 
specific and review of the existing codes in 2011. This made the economy to have multiple codes of corporate 
governance. It is not until April 2015 that exposure draft for 2015 National Codes of Corporate Governance for 
private, public and not – for - profit sectors were released. Therefore, the long – standing debate on the needs of 
corporations to have effective corporate governance mechanisms, which are useful for meeting corporate entity’s 
ultimate objectives and investment decision – making, seems to have reached a defining moment with the 
publications of codes of corporate governance for publicly listed companies.  
 
2.6.0 Theories in Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance has been studied by many scholars during the past five decades, which in turn generated 
some theories and various findings in the area of corporate performance. Among the theories and approaches in 
corporate governance, only seven of them are discussed in this study. The corporate organizational theories 
reviewed in this section provide the rationale for the importance of corporate government, and further help to 
justify the link it has with profitability.   
2.6.1 Agency Theory of Corporate Governance 
Agency theory developed by Jensen and Meckling (1976) is one of the theoretical frameworks underlining the 
issue of corporate governance. They opined that in agency theory, “shareholder value” is typically identified as 
the legitimate goal of the corporation, and the purpose of corporate governance here becomes to rectify deviations 
from this ideal. Accordingly, the definition of problems and the practical corporate governance solutions 
prescribed by agency theory have proven to be very effective (Hansmann and Kraakman, 2001) as a normative 
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blueprint of what constitutes ‘good governance’ (Fligstein, 1993; Lazonick and O’ Sullivan, 2000). According to 
Olaison, et al. (2013), “optimal” view of the corporation and its governance has with equal vigour and 
instrumentality been used in the rapid enforcement of governance standards by individual nations as well as 
international standards setters and will continue to influence future corporate governance regulation. According to 
Daily, et al. (2003), corporate governance has arguably become dominated by agency theory. Thus, very good 
number of researchers has confirmed that generally principles of corporate governance are meant to control the 
internal and external entrenchment practices of executives through internal and external control mechanisms which 
either align the interest of executives with the shareholders or monitor them directly (Walsh, & Seward, 1990; Hill 
& Snell, 1998; Gibbs, 1993; Boyd 1994). Hillman and Dalziel (2003) identify the main activities of the monitoring 
function as: monitoring the CEO, monitoring strategy implementation, planning CEO succession and evaluating 
and rewarding the CEO and top managers of the firm. In this regard, good corporate governance mechanism sets 
the rule, customs, policies upon which the managers (agents) direct and control the activities of firm towards 
meeting the interest of shareholders (principals). As applied to corporate governance, the agency theory suggests 
a fundamental problem for absent or distant owners who employ professional executives to act on their behalf. 
The root assumption informing this theory is that the agent is likely to be self-interested and opportunistic. 
According to Roberts and Young (2006), this raises the prospect that the executive, as agent, will serve their own 
interests rather than those of the owner, principal. This is the agency problem. Basically, the separation of 
ownership and control brings to the fore the agency problems likely in the forms of “moral hazard”, “hidden 
action”, adverse selection or “hidden information”, managerial wealth expropriation or self-centred interests of the 
management at the expense of the shareholders. The agency problems and weak corporate governance, not only 
lead to poor performance and risky financing patterns, but are also conducive for macroeconomic crises (Claessens 
and Joseph, 2003). To counteract such agency problems the principal will have to incur “agency costs”, costs that 
arise from the necessity of creating incentives that align the interests of the executive with those of the shareholders 
and costs incurred by the obligation of monitoring executive conduct to prevent the abuse of owner interests. 
Agency costs are basically incurred on the role of boards of directors to promote good corporate governance. 
Boards of directors have fiduciary duties to shareholders to monitor, supervise and control management activities 
in the company. So, costs associated with agency relationships, and effective governance mechanisms should be 
employed to improve managerial decision making and strategic effectiveness. Therefore, agency theory as a design 
for effective corporate governance tends to promote shareholder value through preferment of small board size to 
large board size, encouragement of large number of non-executive directors serving on the board, board diversity, 
separation of the office of chairman and CEO, promotion of board skills and competence, among other devices.   
Agency theory of corporate governance is a design for neither self-benefit nor fault finding mechanism 
but a scheme to reinforce such cordial relationship among groups that can influence behaviour for better 
performance of the firm. Antle (1989) observes that agency models are highly stylized logical tools for discovering 
basic relationships. They extend the traditional intellectual boundaries of accounting by assuming that its problems 
have psychological, sociological, economic and political dimensions. According to Glautier, et al. (2011), these 
problems have been recognized to some extent in articles dealing with the behavioural aspects of performance 
evaluation. Desai and Yetman (2004) identify cognitive and behavioural limitations as the two areas of agency 
problems that made human ability to make allocation decision imperfect. According to them, the cognitive 
limitation is hidden information. This prevents investors from knowing whether the managers allocate resources 
in the most efficient manner. Also, ICAN (2009) identifies poor information dissemination to shareholders as a 
problem to effective governance and the main issue on the principal - agency literature is centred on asymmetric 
information (Oluwafemi, et al, 2013). Glautier, et al. (2011) opine that agency theory addresses the problem of 
information reporting for assessing managerial behaviour where management holds private information and does 
not communicate it, or communicates only the information that it wants to communicate. According to Desai and 
Yetman (2004), the behavioural limitation, which is also known as opportunism, is hidden character. This may 
circumvent the agents into taking such negative actions that could threaten effective governance. 
Agency theory re-examines extant basic assumptions about human behaviour in organizations, by 
considering behaviour in terms of a model in which protagonists are acting out a principal and agent relationship. 
The theory considers how to structure the relationship so that the agent acts in the best interests of the principal 
(Glautier, et al, 2011: 623). However, Davis, et al. (1997); Olaison, et al. (2013),  note that despite agency theory 
appears to be the dominant paradigm underlying most governance research and prescriptions, researchers have 
suggested theoretical limits of agency theory. Therefore, exclusive reliance upon agency theory is undesirable 
because the complexities of organizational life are ignored.  Ghoshal (2005) finds critiques of its tendency to view 
subjects as under socialized and without a sense of social responsibility. In the view of Zajac and Westphal (1995), 
agency theory is seen as creating a self-fulfilling and untestable model: its “actors” come to act in line with the 
model because the model itself prescribes a dominant rationality; also, that the shareholders wealth maximization 
model may not work because of the agency problem (Pandey, 2010: 842). The theory sees the principal as 
possessing self-interest and the agent also as having self-interest; and without reaching goal congruence, the 
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organizational performance will suffer. From corporate social responsibilities and business ethics view, Roberts 
(2003) argues that agency theory imports a narrow view of the corporation and its goals. In legal studies, Bratton 
(1989) and Ireland (1999) argue that agency theory is charged with obscuring the historical development of 
corporate forms through its simplified assumptions about the primacy of contractual relations and attributions of 
ownership. According to Robe (2011), it disregards the moral justification of the corporate form as it stood before 
the rise of agency theory. Friedman (1953) suggests that the dominance of this prescriptive theory over corporate 
governance research and practice provides every reason to question both the “is” and the “ought” of corporate 
governance as an emerging discipline. Notwithstanding its criticisms from the foregoing, it is evident that agency 
theory considerably extends the debate over the assessment of managerial performance (Glautier, et al, 2011:624). 
Under the agency theory of corporate governance, the main concern is to develop rules and incentives, based on 
implicit or explicit contracts, to eliminate or at least, minimize the conflict of interests between owners and 
managers (Pandey, 2010:842). Accordingly, the firm devises rules and incentives at its own, and there may be in 
additions to legal regulations in a country.  
2.6.2 Shareholder Value Theory of Corporate Governance  
The shareholder value theory was originally proposed by Milton Friedman. It was first come to prominence with 
the publication in 1986 of “Creating Shareholder Value” by the United States academic, Alfred Rappaport. It 
provides that the sole responsibility of a firm is to increase profits. It is an extension of agency theory of firms. 
While the agency theory focuses on examining the relationship between the agent (manager) and the principal 
(shareholder), the shareholder value theory centres on the value creation of the managers and the efficiency of the 
management  measured by profitability indices. It suggests that managers should attempt to make as much profits 
as possible (ICAN, 2009). It is based on the premise that managers are hired as the agents of the owners to run the 
firm for their benefits, “and therefore they are legally and morally obligated to serve their interests.” Accordingly, 
“the only qualification on the rule to make as much money as possible is ‘conformity to the basic rules of the 
society, both those embodied in law and those embodied in ethical custom.’” It has been argued that “the 
fundamental goal of all business is to maximize shareholder value.” Shareholder value approach considers 
pursuing profit as the ultimate purpose of the business for its growth, survival and continuity. The idea that 
management’s focus and responsibility is to increase value has gained widespread acceptance. A failure to seek to 
maximize shareholder value results in pressure from the board of directors and activist shareholders (Wolfer, 2000). 
It is therefore suggests that the pressure to pursue for shareholder value creation is merely to meet certain 
leadership interest and owners objectives; rather than being a legalized objective. ICAN (2009) argues that 
managers tend to purse this objective because of the fact that the ordinary shareholders are, in law, the owners of 
the organization. They have ultimate control of the company and take residual profits (ICAN, 2009:8). According 
to Wolfer (2000), the need to prevent takeover movement provided another powerful incentive for managers to 
focus on creating value. This is because the only compelling takeover defence is to deliver superior shareholder 
value. Given the globalization of capital markets and their diminishing boundaries, economic systems will slowly 
run out of capital, if they are unable to create shareholder wealth and thereby attract investors (Wolfer, 2000). 
Maximizing shareholder value has unquestionably become “the dominant economic creed: with a vast impact on 
management practice.” 
The shareholder value theory has the risk that the board of directors appointed by the shareholders might 
combine force with the management against the firm and the society. Accordingly, executive directors might 
conspire with the other directors (representative of shareholders) who are interested in short-term gains to extract 
value from the corporation at the expense of other stakeholders. Denning (2014) identifies the risk that the 
executives might manipulate the stock price through the use of share buybacks; the directors taking various actions 
at their disposal so that their personal benefits would be significantly higher than those of the general shareholders. 
Today, many original owners of corporations have eventually lost out from the ownership control to their agents. 
The shareholders thus, become the highest losers where corporate governance lost to corporate manipulations, 
corporate expropriations, lack of adequate control, weak board, and lack of probity, transparency, integrity and 
accountability (Nwonyuku, 2012a:37). Further Denning (2014) highlights other various risks involved in 
shareholder value approach to include: the risk of pervasive short-termism; the risk of combines of executives and 
shareholders; the risk of stock price manipulations; the risk of executive cronyism; the risk of turning talent into 
vampires (systematically extracting value rather than creating it); the risk of dismantling whole organizations; the 
risk of losing whole industries; the risk of short-changing customers; the risk of locking in obsolete management 
practices; the risk of dispiriting employees; the risk of failing to renew human capital; the risk of undermining 
communities; the risk of killing international competitiveness; the risk of undermining investment and economic 
growth; the risk of malfeasance becoming endemic; the risk of successive economic crashes; the risk of increasing 
income inequality;  the risk of concentration of economic power; the risk of corrupting society itself. According 
to Nwonyuku (2012a), the emergence of these fraudulent practices can lead to shareholders value depreciation, 
depletion, loss of ownership and control and destruction of the entire business empire. Furthermore, ICAN (2009) 
identifies the deficiencies of this theory to include: a situation where a company, for the purpose of expanding its 
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operations, may raise additional capital but the additional profits generated may not justify the additional capital 
obtained and in this case, profits may be rising but earnings per share may be falling; a company may be earning 
short-term profits at the expense of long-term profitability; and profit maximization ignores business risk, which 
is an unavoidable fact of business life as business organizations operate into the future. More so, a common 
criticism touching shareholder value is often the misunderstanding that a value-based strategy disregards the other 
stakeholder of the company (Wolfer, 2000) and also negates corporate social responsibility principles. Shareholder 
value consideration has been attributed with “self-interested management and short sighted focus on current stock 
price coupled with corporate restructuring and employee layoffs. The problem is that many corporations have 
driven the concept to an extreme. They have engaged in knee-jerk cost cutting when all slack has already been 
removed from the system. More so, the inherent dangers involved with the theory historic way of doing business 
by concentrating solely on the interests of shareholders have its focus on short term strategy and greater risk taking. 
“The role of shareholder value theory can be seen in the demise of corporations such as Enron and WorldCom 
where continuous pressure on managers to increase returns to shareholders led them to manipulate the company 
accounts.” Also, Smith (2013) has argued that the mantra that ‘the CEO and board have a fiduciary duty to 
maximize shareholder value’ is untrue and moreover, the widespread acceptance of that false motion has done 
considerable harm. According to him, there is no guide prepared for directors of corporations by law firms and 
other experts that contains a stipulation for directors to maximize shareholder value on the list of things they are 
supposed to do. It is not a legal requirement. And there is a good reason for that. Smith (2013) broadly stresses 
that directors and officers have a duty of care and duty of loyalty to the corporation, not to the shareholders in 
particular. “A director is an agent of company and, as such, is under a fiduciary duty towards the company. He 
must therefore, act bona fide in the interests of the company” (Adesanya and Oloyede, 1981:235). From another 
dimension, Smith (2013) argues that shareholders are the equity owners and equity is a residual claim from 
corporations. Equity holders are at the bottom of obligation chain. Boards of Directors do not have a legal 
foundation to give them preference over other parties or stakeholders that legitimately have stronger economic 
interests in the company than shareholders do. According to him, the idea of “the last shall come first” thinking 
was established in 1976 by the economists Michael Jensen and William Meckling of Harvard Business Review. 
Amusingly, board members themselves promote the “maximize shareholder value” canard. In other words, this 
idea did not come out of legal analysis, changes in regulation, or court decisions. It was simply an academic theory 
that went mainstream – Agency theory. Thus, the implications of Jensen’s Agency theory of pushing companies 
to favour shareholders, when they actually stand at the back from a legal perspective is poor treatment of employees, 
fraud, tax avoidance, weaken regulation, forge financial reports, making indecent returns, ineffective corporate 
governance system, high labour turnover, low wage pay and low employee welfare, financial crises and boards 
complacency.  
2.6.3 Stewardship Theory in Corporate Governance 
‘Contrary to agency theory’s pessimistic assumptions about the self-interested and self-serving motives of 
executives, stewardship theory suggests the potential for what it calls the “pro-organizational” motives of directors.’ 
Roberts and Young (2006) argue that the key contribution of stewardship theory lies in its questioning of agency 
theory’s pessimistic assumptions about human nature. According to them, what drives performance here is not the 
aligned greed of an executive but their personal identification with the aims and purposes of the organization. The 
idea of stewardship theory came from the work of Donaldson and Davis (1991). The theory is based on the 
assumption that the interest of shareholders and the interest of management are aligned therefore management is 
motivated to take decisions that would maximize performance and total value of the company (Tornyeva and 
Wereko, 2012). Unlike agency theory, stewardship theory assumes that managers are stewards whose behaviours 
are aligned with the objectives of their shareholders. The theory assumes that managers, left on their own, will 
indeed act as responsible stewards of the assets they control. Davis, et al. (1997), see stewardship theory as 
psychological and sociological approaches to governance. The stewardship theory argues and looks at a different 
form of motivation for agents drawn from organizational theory. The concepts of stewardship attempt to resolve 
the conflict of interest between the shareholders and managers to a certain extent and in doing so promote goal 
congruence. In this theory, managers are viewed as loyal, discipline and honest to the company and interested in 
achieving high performance.  The dominant motive which directs managers to accomplish their job, is their desire 
to perform excellently. It reinvigorates the relationship between the principal and agents by looking at it from 
opposite angle to that of the agency theory. According to Donaldson and Davis (1991), stewardship theory believes 
the board of Directors as a group of top corporate players will maximize the firm performance, rather than their 
individual interest, to increase the wealth of shareholders. Htay, et al. (2013), posit that, since the goal of stewards 
is to maximize the shareholders’ wealth through firm performance, it promotes the goal congruence between 
shareholders and top management. Specifically, “managers are conceived as being motivated by a need to achieve, 
to gain intrinsic satisfaction through successfully performing inherently challenging work, to exercise 
responsibility and authority, and thereby to gain recognition from peers and bosses.” According to Tornyeva and 
Wereko (2012), the stewardship theory believes that there is greater utility in cooperative than individualistic 
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behaviour and hence whilst the actions of management would be maximizing shareholder wealth, it would at the 
same time be meeting their personal needs. This helps to reduce self- centeredness of either of the party and tends 
to reduce agency problem while promoting good corporate governance practice that will ensure improved 
profitability. According to Pandey (2010), managers are assumed to work efficiently and honestly in the interests 
of company and owners and they are self-directed and are motivated by high achievements and responsibility in 
discharging their duties.    
In this theory, managers are seen to be more persuaded to achieve result by intrinsic motivational force. 
Pandey (2010) believes that managers in this theory, are goal – oriented and self - motivated and feel constrained 
if they are controlled by outside directors. Based on this, the theory argues that an organization requires a 
governance structure that allows “harmonization to be achieved most efficiently between managers and owners.” 
In the context of firm’s leadership structure, “this situation is attained more readily if the CEO is also the chairman 
of the board. This leadership structure will assist them to attain superior performance to the extent that the CEO 
exercises complete authority over the corporation and that their role is unambiguous and unchallenged.” Suffice 
this to say that, based on the stewardship theory, it can be derived that it is not necessary to control the top 
management since they are the stewards to act in the best interests of the shareholders through firm performance 
(Htay, et al., 2013). As a result, they prefer the combined board leadership structure of CEO and board chairperson 
duality to ensure that the firms are under operating in one direction and to get more commitment from the top 
leaders (Wan, Wan, and Idris, 2012). In this situation, “power and authority are concentrated in a single person,” 
“the expectations about corporate leadership will be clearer and more consistent both for subordinate managers 
and for other members of the corporate board”. As a result, there will be “no room for uncertainty as to who has 
authority or responsibility over a particular matter;” and “the organization will enjoy the benefits of unity of 
direction and strong command and control.” More so, the theory refutes the assumption that board aims and 
motives are opposed to those of the shareholders. It insists that both the agent and the principal have an interest in 
maximizing the long–term stewardship of a company.  Stewardship theory requires directors to be accountable to 
owners for the resources entrusted to them. This theory represents a consensus perspective which rejects the notion 
that the board of directors is a disciplining mechanism to align conflict of interest between shareholders and 
managers (Dabor, et al. 2015). According to Davis, et al. (1997), the managers protect and maximize shareholders 
wealth through firm performance, because by so doing, their utility functions are maximized. To achieve this goal 
congruent, the shareholders must put in place appropriate empowering governance structure and mechanisms, 
information and authority to facilitate the autonomy of management to take decisions that would maximize their 
utility as they achieve organizational rather than self-serving objectives (Davis, et al. (1997). For CEOs who are 
stewards, Donaldson and Davis (1991) posit that their pro-organizational actions are best facilitated when the 
corporate governance structures give them high authority and discretion. Therefore, stewardship theory suggests 
the potentially negative impact of a separation of responsibilities between a chairman and CEO. The roles, as it 
suggests, should remain combined in order to protect a key aspect of high performance; the strength and authority 
of executive leadership. It follows the debate that it is not the leadership structure, but the potentials and attributes 
of the leadership determine the performance of the firm. Davis, et al. (1997) identified five components of the 
management philosophy of stewardship as trust, open communication, empowerment, long-term orientation and 
performance enhancement. To bring these attributes to the boardroom, an organization must be ready to appoint a 
sizeable number of executive directors with wide range of diversity and skills as well as independence of mind. 
The firm must be willing to put in place such corporate policy that will encourage training and development, 
accountability, transparency, equal opportunity to all persons and effective information flow. However, Htay, et 
al. (2013), posit that the agency theory and stewardship theory are developed based on the perception that directors 
are opportunists. Accordingly, in the stewardship theory, directors believe that the success of the firms will bring 
them to be impressed by the market and it will bring for their betterment (Htay, et al, 2013). Also, stewardship 
model has both insider and outsider attributes. According to Garcia, et al. (2008), this approach is more difficult 
to classify purely as stakeholder or shareholder. Notwithstanding, it has the combination of most elements of the 
stakeholder model.  
2.6.4 Stakeholder Theory in Corporate Governance  
The idea of stakeholder theory was originally developed by Edward Freeman through his publication in 1984. It 
is the extension of the responsibility of top corporate players from the shareholder focus to other stakeholders 
(Htay, et al. 2013). Stakeholder theory challenges agency assumptions about the primacy of shareholder interest. 
Instead, it argues that a company should be managed in the best interests of all its stakeholders. These interests 
include not only those of the shareholder but also a wide range of other direct and indirect interests. From agency 
theory and shareholder value perspectives, the managers have the sole objective of maximizing the wealth of 
shareholders. Stakeholder theory considers this view to be too myopic, narrow, one-sided and unbalanced interest, 
particularly, since the actions of the managers can have effect on other interested groups than just shareholders. In 
order to address this gap, Freeman (1984) developed the stakeholder theory with emphasis on the need for 
managers to have corporate accountability to stakeholders instead of shareholders. Freeman (1984) defines 
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stakeholders as “any group or individual that can affect or is affected by the achievement of a corporation’s 
purpose.” Stakeholders have also been defined as “those groups without whose support the organization would 
cease to exist” (Freeman, 1984: 31). According to Donaldson and Preston (1995), stakeholders are the identifiable 
groups or persons who have legitimate interest in an organization and these interests have intrinsic value. 
Stakeholders are all legitimate parties to an organization which ensure that the needed resources for meeting the 
ultimate objectives of the enterprises are constantly flowing to the desired direction in the best interest of the 
overall groups. It is on this premise that the concept of collective responsibility is anchored. It sees every legitimate 
party to the business as an integral part of the business; such that an injury to a party is an injury to all; and an 
injury to the business is an injury to all. Thus, the theory believes that the firm performance is a general concern; 
and not to a specific group.   
According to Donaldson and Preston (1995) stakeholders are identified through the actual or potential 
harms and benefits that they experience or anticipate experiencing as a result of firm’s actions or inactions. The 
stakeholder theory holds that companies are accountable for their stewardship over the resources entrusted to them 
by a coalition of various stakeholders (Dabor, et al. 2015). Ever since stakeholder theory was developed, corporate 
governance perspective has been taken from a narrow view to a broad view. Htay, et al, (2013), point that 
stakeholder theory seems to be the combination of a few philosophical ideas from economics, ethics, law and 
organizational aspects. It is a management theory. The theory seems to give attention on business morality in 
addition to the maximization of the profit (Htay, 2012). The concept of this theory has currently been adopted by 
some of the corporate governance guidelines (Htay, et al, 2013), and in Nigeria, 2011 and 2015 codes of corporate 
governance give credence to it by extending the responsibility of the directors to other stakeholder. Section 28 of 
2011 code of corporate governance encourages for more relationship with other stakeholders. Section 4.2 confirms 
the paramount responsibility of the board is to ensure the positive performance of the company in creating value 
for all its stakeholders. The corporate governance efforts are intended to empower those stakeholders who 
contribute or control critical resources and skills and to ensure that the interests of these stakeholders are aligned 
with that of shareholders (Pandey, 2010). Cadbury (2002) pointed that “corporate governance is concerned with 
holding the balance between economic and social goals and between individual and communal goal and the aim 
is to align as nearly as possible the interests of individuals, corporations and society.” Cadbury (1992) might have 
keenly understood that incessant corporate collapses is as a result of heavy push to protect only the interest of 
shareholders without having on board the interest of other related individuals and society. Stakeholder perspective 
thus tries to strike a balance between designing a governance structure that would meet the objective of 
shareholders, and while meeting the needs of the other legitimate groups. The stakeholder theory is based on the 
premise that the fundamental responsibility of managers is to maximize the total wealth of all stakeholders of the 
firm, rather than only the shareholders’ wealth (Pandey, 2010: 842–843). The global corporate governance crisis 
has further reinforced the message that governance of firms should always aim at protecting the interests of all 
stakeholders.  
Further, Erhardt, et al. (2003), argue that the theory reveals the function of the board of directors in the 
theory creation of utilities thus allowing other variables of production to earn their rewards. The stakeholders view 
considers that investors, employees, suppliers, customers, creditors, debt financiers, auditors, corporate regulators, 
society and other stakeholders all generally contribute to the firm performance and should in return receive benefits 
from the firm. According to Okereke (2013), stakeholder value will only be enhanced when a company treats its 
employees well, serves its customers well, maintains good relationship with suppliers, and has a reputation for 
civic responsibility and legal compliance. Donaldson and Preston (1995) clearly point out that the stakeholder 
theory is focused on how management decision making affects all the stakeholders and no one interest group 
should be able to dominate the others. According to Tornyeva and Wereko (2012), the theory also proposed for 
the inclusion of the different legitimate interest groups in the organization’s board in order to ensure consensus 
building and to avoid conflicts of interest. This is in addition to the positions of stewardship and resource 
dependency theories. In order to achieve this purpose, the boards of directors in the stakeholder theory adds to 
their functions to serve as arbitrators where conflict of interests may arise among the various stakeholders and to 
ensure effective communication and information system to all stakeholders in an accurate and timely manner. 
Donaldson and Preston (1995) confirm this when they assert that the board serves as arbitration over the conflicting 
interests of the stakeholders and brings about cohesion needed for the achievement of the organizational objectives. 
Jensen (2001) notes that this situation has given managers the discretionary powers to decide on whose interest to 
serve. In order not to lose sight, Jensen (2001) suggested that managers should pursue objectives that would lead 
to increasing the long-term value of the firm since this would not be attained by ignoring the interest of some of 
the stakeholders. Pursuing the long-term value of the firm still will not make the managers to be unfair since every 
other stakeholder will remain to benefit from such value, but the employee benefit will expire on the virtue of age, 
length of service, or through other means that will bring such employee’s exit from the firm. The implication is 
that the employee is still being short–changed at the long run. 
In relation to company performance, Roberts and Young (2006) assert that stakeholder theory has aided 
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in curtailing high executive pay which has negatively affected the level of operating income as well as the level of 
firm’s profitability. Accordingly, excessive levels of executive pay and the way that these have often gone 
alongside with company downsizing scheme and all its negative impacts on employees and local communities 
undermine the legitimacy of the demand for “shareholder value”. Further, the importance that is now given to 
corporate value statements, as well as the board’s role in creating corporate ethics codes, and social and 
environmental reporting all reflect an acknowledgement of a wider set of corporate obligations beyond the delivery 
of shareholder value (Roberts and Young 2006). More so, following this theory, firm’s objective is not only limited 
to creating shareholder’s value, also to maximize the welfare or the need of other legitimate interest groups. This 
could be in the form of improving quality product; product price efficiency; providing corporate social 
responsibility; timely and accurate payment of taxes; promoting environmental and social friendliness; promoting 
employee welfare and training and development scheme; facilitating technological innovation; promoting research 
and development; improving financial reporting quality, among others. These benefits hopefully might have 
warranted Lashgari (2004) to describe corporate governance as being concerned with managing the relationship 
among various corporate stakeholders.  
However, Roberts and Young (2006), identify the major limitation of stakeholder theory is its complexity 
“to operationalize because of the difficulties of deciding what weight should be given to different stakeholders 
interests.” According to Roberts and Young (2006), it is argued in terms of corporate governance that if executives 
were to be made accountable to all of a company’s stakeholders they would be answerable to none. Similarly, 
Tornyeva and Wereko (2012), note that this theory has been criticised for putting too much burden on managers 
by making them accountable to many stakeholders without specific guidelines for solving problems resulting from 
conflicting interests. The boards find it difficult to offer optimal service to any given stakeholder. As a result, 
different stakeholders see the board as bias and not independent in their actions. In another development, Sternberg 
(1996) disagrees that publicly traded corporations should be “responsive to the rights and wishes of stakeholders” 
as proposed by Demb and Neubauer (1992). According to Sternberg (1996), “stakeholder theory is both misguided 
and mistaken,” and that “stakeholder theory accountability is unjustified,” it “undermines private property, agency 
and wealth,” it “is incompatible with business” and “with corporate governance”. This theory has also been 
criticized for adopting a single-valued objective (Jensen, 2001). According to Jensen (2001), the performance of 
an organization is not only measured by returns to the stakeholders but equally important is the management of 
information in the organization with particular reference to vertical communication inter-personal relationships in 
the organization and the working environment. As a result of the complex nature of the stakeholder relationship 
and the need for the better management of the different interest groups, Donaldson and Preston (1995) have 
contended that stakeholder theory should not be a single theory, as such classified it into three different approaches 
of descriptive, instrumental and normative. 
2.6.5 Resource Dependency Theory of Corporate Governance 
The resource dependency theory was originally proposed by Pfeffer in 1973 and later developed by the work of 
Pfeffer and Salancik in 1978. The basic proposition of resource dependence theory is the need for environmental 
linkages between the firm and outside resources. Resource dependency theory is the study of how the external 
resources of organizations affect the behaviour of the organization. The theory is based on procurement of external 
resource for the growth and survival of an organization. The procurement of external resources is an important 
tenet of both the strategic and tactical management of any company. The board is thus seen as a source of resources 
that can be procured. Boards of directors serve to connect the firm with external factors by co-opting the resources 
needed to survive (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). According to Roberts and Young (2006), seeing the board as a 
source of resources for a company opens up a very different way to think about the board’s role in creating high 
performance. Accordingly, when an organization appoints an individual to a board, it expects the individual will 
come to support the organization, will concern himself with its problems, will variably present it to others, and 
will try to aid it (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978:173). While agency theory sees the role of boards of directors as 
primarily monitoring and policing, the resource dependency theory sees their role as basically provision of 
resources – capital and managerial experience. Unlike agency theory, their original ideas were inductively derived 
from empirical studies (Roberts and Young, 2006).  
Hillman, et al. (2000), identify the various forms of resources directors bring to the company to include 
information, skills, access to key constituents such as suppliers, buyers, public policy makers, social groups as 
well as legitimacy. Further, Hilman and Dalzied (2003), provide that resources can take a variety of forms each of 
which can be argued to add to the “capital” of a company. According to Gkliatis (2009), board capital has been 
positively associated with the provision of advice and counsel, the provision of firm legitimacy and reputation, the 
provision of channels of communication and the acquirement of resources elements outside the firm (financial 
capital influence and influence with political bodies or other important stakeholder groups). According to 
Johannisson and Huse (2000), the boards of directors perform these functions through social and professional 
networking. They also use their goodwill and reputational embraces to draw market, financial and economic 
wheels towards improving firm performance.  
Industrial Engineering Letters                                                                                                                                                            www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-6096 (Paper) ISSN 2225-0581 (online) 
Vol.6, No.3, 2016 
 
67 
The implications of resource dependence theory revolve round “the optimal divisional structure of 
organizations, recruitment of board members and employees, production strategies, contract structure, external 
organizational links, and many other aspects of organizational strategy.” According to Roberts and Young (2006), 
their key contribution is the constitution of the non – executive element of a board, can provide the firm with a 
vital set of resources. Further, Roberts and Young (2006) opine that non–executive directors can be a source of 
skills and expertise that an organization cannot afford to employ full time, but which executives can draw upon, 
both the form of specific skills as well as advice and counsel in relation to strategy and its implementation. They 
can also serve as an important source of contacts, information and relationships that allow executives to better 
manage some of the uncertainties in the environment. Accordingly, the value of the non – executive lies not only 
in their expertise but also through their networks that give the company really access to new markets or to sources 
of finance, as well as in the reputation benefits that arise from individual’s association with the company. This 
follows that non – executives are greatly appreciated than their inside directors counterparts because of their ability 
to provide the organization with board capital and board motivation (Okougbo, 2011:36). It is in this regard that 
board capital and board motivation have been explained as: providing legitimacy, bolstering the public image of 
the company, providing expertise, administering advice and counsel, linking the company to important 
stakeholders or other important entities, facilitating access to resources such as capital, building external relations, 
diffusing innovation and creativity, and assisting in the formulation of firm strategy (Gkliatis, 2009:2). 
The resource dependence theory according to Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) highlights the interdependence 
between organizations and their environment. According to Hillman, Schropshire, and Cannella (2007), this 
suggests that firms are not self- sufficient and rely on the external environment for survival. In this regard, board 
composition provides the opportunity for better performance of the firm since it creates the required linkages of 
the company with external resources. Johnson, et al. (1996), state that firms have to create links with the external 
environment and board members can serve as one of those links. Thus, the resource – dependence role of directors 
according to Hillman, Cannellas, and Harris (2002) suggest board composition will impact external linkages to the 
firm’s environment. Marlin and Geiger (2012) are of the opinion that larger board size may increase the number 
of external linkages and thus increase the potential for securing needed resources. Following the resource 
dependence theory, it could be logically in order to say that the larger the size of the directors on the boards, the 
better the performance of the firms since the boards are seen as reservoirs of resources keenly needed for greater 
corporate performance. Dalton, et al. (1999); Booth and Deli (1996); Booth and Deli (1996); Provan (1980) also 
believe that the theory favours larger boards. Also, having considered the essence of diversity in deriving greater 
resources to pilot the organizations, it will also be in agreement to hold that permitting larger proportion of gender 
on the boards of directors will thus enhance the linkage to achieve efficiency of operation and improve strategic 
decision making of the boards. Zahra and Pearce (1989) also believe that the diverse background of the directors 
enhance the quality of their advice, counselling, information and legitimacy. In a similar direction, it is also in 
agreement that by increasing board skills and competence as one of the resources required of the board to drive 
other resources, corporate performance will be stimulated. 
2.6.6 Political Theory of Corporate Governance 
Over the last decades, the government of a country has been seen to have a strong political influence on firms 
(Yusoff and Alhaji, 2012). As a result, there is an entrance of political wheel into the governance structure of firms’ 
mechanism (Hawley and Williams, 1996). The foundation of political perspective of corporate governance was 
laid by Mark J.  Roe in the 1990s and in his subsequent publications over the years brought the development of 
this nascent theory to fore. The political theory is of the view that the initial and subsisting act upon which the 
development of corporate governance system is based on the political choice of a nation. What a country does with 
its legal tradition and system turns on politics: the rules that determine the extent of economic competition within 
and between countries; the laws and decrees that structure banking, corporate finance, and the securities industry; 
the rules that shape the markets for capital and labour; and the degree of state involvement in the economy are all 
political framework. According to Roe (2003), Politics dominates explanations about corporate governance system. 
Yet, politics which ought to have dominated in the matters of corporate governance is neglected by the various 
theorists in corporate governance. The theory challenges the other leading interpretations that stress the primacy, 
and autonomy of corporate governance. The theory opens wider the door of exploration of political influences on 
corporate law and behaviour (Gourevitch, 2003). Accordingly, it helps to evaluate the status of politics in 
interpretations of corporate governance and to examine the different meanings that can be given to political 
explanations as well as provides an important opportunity to examine the status of politics in the conflicting 
interpretations of corporate governance (Gourevitch, 2003). This is as no one really doubts that politics has 
something to do with corporate governance, but theorists vary considerably in the status they give to politics in a 
casual model (Gourevitch, 2003). For Instance, Roe (1994) provides that the American corporate governance 
system emerged as a result of both economic evolution and its democratic philosophy. 
Corporate governance structure of a business enterprise relates to formal and informal contractual 
agreements among corporate stakeholders (Lashgari, 2004). Charreaux (2004) believes the state to be an essential 
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link for political direction of a business enterprise. This is because every emerging firm is as a result of existing 
political framework put in force by the governance structure. Such firm can as well be weakened by the same 
political caravan that shot it up. From the foregoing discussion of the nature of externalities and the role of 
government in resolving corporate governance issues, it is apparent that effective corporate governance is 
inconclusive without laying emphasis on the role of state in the formation and reforming the governance system. 
As such, whatever the formal specifications of corporate law, politics shapes daily the calculations made by all 
players (Roe, 2003). According to Roe (2003), corporate governance arrangements inside the firm interact deeply 
with a nation’s politics. Political forces – party systems, political institutions, political orientations of governments 
and coalitions, ideologies, and interest groups – are the primary determinates of the degree of shareholder diffusion 
and the relationships among managers, owners, workers, and other stakeholders of the firm (Roe, 2003). 
Gomez and Korine (2011) point that the role of a state within this framework is to constantly re-question 
entrepreneurial power so as to maintain acceptable limits for individual freedom. This it does through two 
mechanisms: the market, which creates rivalry between firms, and democracy, which legitimizes power by 
splintering it. Gomez and Korine (2011) argue that a corporate governance model based only on the calculations 
of individual interests does not maximize economic performance for society, and that market–self regulation is 
inadequate. Thus, political theory of governance seems to regulate markets to ensure the convergence of both 
public and private interests. It brings coherence between protection of investors, employees and competitive 
character of the goods and services markets (Charreaux, 2004). It centres on the political economy of corporate 
governance. According to Pandey (2010), the political theory states that it is the government that decides the 
allocation of control, rights, responsibility, profit, among others, between owners, managers, employees and other 
stakeholders. Within the overall macro-structure, each stakeholder may try to enhance its bargaining power to 
negotiate higher allocation in its favour. The corporate governance efforts will, thus, depend on the allocated 
powers of the stakeholders (Pandey, 2010: 843).  
While other theories in corporate governance focus effective corporate governance in terms of economic 
performance, the political theory has its focus on philosophical, political and historical analyses. In doing so, it 
identifies a common logic that links both the democratization of corporate governance and the growth of economic 
performance. According to Gomez and Korine (2011), the theory demonstrates a pattern of change that reflects a 
tendential democratization of corporate governance. Political theory of corporate governance is underpinned to the 
fact that the firm is first and foremost a political organization, incontestably the single most important driver in 
today’s societies (Gomez and Korine, 2011). It provides the democratization process that ensures fairness, 
transparency and accountability of the board. It helps to facilitate participation of all stakeholders - minority 
shareholders, majority shareholders, employees, government, and regulators through a democratic process. It 
creates room for all stakeholders to exercise their rights as provided by the political structure (government) through 
Companies Act, Code of Best Practices, NSE Listing requirements, and other regulatory provisions created out of 
political system to ensure smooth running of organizations. Thus, political nature of corporate governance puts 
emphasis on the protective role of the state over the existing firm’s property. It assumes that corporate governance 
must increasingly become more democratic to be seen as legitimate. According to Yusoff and Alhaji (2012), 
political theory brings the approach of developing voting support from shareholders, rather by purchasing voting 
power. Accordingly, having a political influence in corporate governance may direct corporate governance within 
the organization. According to Charreaux (2004), political theory creates productive efficiency through protection 
of shareholders’ interests and reduction of costs of opportunism but not those of management errors. According to 
Roe (2003), political forces account for the difference in choice of corporate governance modes among advanced 
industrial countries. In social democracies that support interest of employees, the managers have less incentive to 
perform their managerial duties in the best interest of the shareholders. Roe (2003) argues where social democracy 
is strong, shareholder rights are weak, and shareholder diffusion is low. Social democracy gives voice to claims 
on the firm in addition to those of the shareholders: employee job securities, income distribution, etc. 
The theory points how political states will fit into the economic world on a base beneficial to both. 
According to Yusoff and Alhaji (2012), the political model highlights the allocation of corporate power, profits 
and privileges that are determined via the governments’ favour, and it can have an immense influence on 
governance developments. Political theory has also been referred to as public system. In Pound (1983) assertion, 
public interest is much reserved as the government participates in corporate decision making, taking into 
consideration cultural challenges. It has been argued that this theory is crucial to “rescue corporate governance 
from its ideologies and failures, restoring concern with governance where it belongs – as centrally located in 
classical political questions, by reconnecting issues of the political legitimacy of power in the corporation, the 
historical evolution of corporate governance forms, with questions of economic performance.” This is to say, the 
success of a corporation is a reflection of the success of political structure from where it emerged. Corporate 
governance system is thus a resemblance of the political thought of a nation. As a matter of fact, the political 
instrument in which the ideal of good corporate governance is braced ought to be partaker of its shaping and should 
as well decide the way and form the allocation of the resources should be made for the betterment of the entire 
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society. This will help to reintegrate the firms fairly into political–economy structure of the state, by ensuring that 
every stakeholder is better off just as the firm gets better.  
However, the political theory has also been criticized of providing incomplete account as it neglects 
political preferences and interest group model that cut across the class divide (Gourievitch, 2003). Some authors 
have argued that while there is the recognition of the fact that politics matters in corporate governance system, but 
it does not appear to have a substantive theory of politics. Some authors are of the view that the argument of 
political theory is based on the excessive regulations, “the political constraints rendering firm less than optimal.” 
It is also argued that the political influence of corporate governance is as a result of the state moves to meet its 
obligatory and optional functions to the country. These functions are already being paid for by the members of the 
state through a compulsory tax and levies imposed upon the citizens. Therefore, the political influence on the 
corporate governance needs not to be overblown as such impact is normal. The political perspective also needs to 
understand that the presence of politics in the corporate governance system is to aid the state attains its national 
economic objectives consequently; political effect needs not to contest as a theory of its own. 
2.6.7 Value–synergy Approach to Corporate Governance 
Value–synergy approach is developed on the foundation of stakeholder’s theory and following the need to simplify 
the complexity of stakeholder perspective into some specific approaches. Value-synergy approach is on the 
personnel – employee of the firm. It is intended to encourage self – control and social control through intrinsic 
motivation, ethics and morality. In the very core of the value–synergy dwells the fact that an organization is an 
idea that comprises of diverse individuals with different embodiment of resources. That an organization from its 
set-up is in anticipation that some persons must surely come together to make its purpose come true. And that, the 
individuals are selected on the basis of the resources they are endowed with; and which the organization must 
utilize if it is to keep its vision alive. These different individuals bring on board their physical wealth, while some 
others are with their intellectual or mental capital; all merged together for the purpose of deriving the long – term 
value of the firm. It is not only the incorporators that can make the designated objectives of firms to be attained. 
All human factors’ efforts are of equal important in this regard. Employees offer their intellectual and physical 
prosperity while investors or incorporators offer physical or material treasure; making both as co-owners of the 
idea to make the organization flourish. As a matter of fact, the employees should be given an equal and unique 
place just as the investors in the value–chain. Employers should be considered as integral owners of the firm hence, 
should be showered with good human relations. The value-synergy proposal seeks the need to formally recognize 
employees as a direct stakeholder in the organization and as a key participant in the corporate process, rather than 
being depicted as a mere factor of production and a commodity traded in the labour market that can be hired and 
fired at a choice. This new view of employees is an important element in a transition to a more balanced governance 
structure. Thus, by applying good human relations, the required resources of individuals can be harnessed to 
improve performance as well as be protected. According to Roberts and Young (2006), the employee is obviously 
a key stakeholder and there have been long – running debates amongst governance academics that, employees just 
as shareholders are “residual risk-takers” in a firm. According to Roberts and Young (2006), an employee’s 
investment in firm – specific skills means that they too should have a voice in the governance of the firm. Tipgos 
and Keefe (2004) point that at the core of restructuring corporate governance is empowerment at all levels – 
shareholders, the board, top management and the employees – consistent with the concept of empowered or 
reengineered organizations. The goals and objectives of the corporation will be a shared vision. 
This value–synergy approach is based on the wish of the employee to be identified, recognized, treat with 
respect, esteem and value and included into the organization leadership structure as part of the reward for 
intellectual commitment. This yields sense of belonging, socially desirable and admiration of love which builds 
passion, commitment and greater focus to face any work challenge and to be more innovative and result–oriented 
leading to higher performance. The individual feels satisfied when the asset he brings on board is given recognition, 
value, respect, and cooperation. The value–synergy approach adopts three distinct needs or motives that can 
motivate people’s behaviour to perform in McClelland’s Achievement theory. According to Nwonyuku (2015a), 
they are the need for achievement, the need for power, and the need for affiliation. The Achievement theory is of 
the view that the needs or motives for recognition and seeking to avoid humiliation for pain are innate and not 
learned. When human relationship is bashed, inequity will result. 
According to Nwonyuku (2015c), a firm objective that seeks to maximize the welfare of all its legitimate 
groups will create long – term success for the firm. This success creation can be accelerated and sustained by the 
firm in a most possible manner where all the legitimate groups are seen and made to be seen as value creation. On 
this premise, the value–synergy theory believes that labour (employee) is the most viable, vibrant and valuable 
factor in the firm, but least considered and treated as an element of  hire and fire - use and dump (Nwonyuku, 
2015c). An employee thus, is the most delegated and relegated in the course of meeting the corporation objective. 
The concept is of the view that employee has very little regards in the leadership structure. Accordingly, this 
negative attitude of the owner that is just a factor of production against the employee, another key factor of 
production is the remote cause of firm failure more than anything else (Nwonyuku, 2015c). This is because there 
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is no true alignment of value between the two human factors in the production setting (Nwonyuku 2015c). 
According to the concept, when firm owners begin to ascribe value to employee and see them as equal important 
that can create value, higher value will begin to flow out of them. This is the basis of value-synergy approach of 
organization. It is the use of value to derive higher value. Value-synergy approach is also regarded as value–
inclusiveness approach. In this perspective, every component of the organization is given regard and high esteem. 
Concentration is not only focused on the top management board alone. Employee interest is internalized by giving 
them place in the leadership structure. This is unlike other theories in corporate governance, where virtually all 
directors serving on the boards are imposed from outside, and making the leadership to seen as opportunists who 
have few time to stay and feed on the value other factors of production such as employees have grown over the 
years (Nwonyuku, 2015c). Thus, the value-synergy postulation believes that as the interests of other legitimate 
groups are met, the value creation objective of the firm becomes easier and done unconsciously. However, financial 
expropriation affinity creeps in when there is sense of insecurity, sense of disrespect, loss of value, loss of sense 
of belongingness, loss of collective ownership ideology, loss of accountability, poor empowerment, and lack of 
transparency. Consequently, when the other components in the value-chain have the feelings of being unimportant, 
using legitimate but un-gainful approach to dispose the assets of the organization will eventually gain ground. But, 
these factors can be ethically controlled by making every stakeholder to feel relevant, included and work as a 
unifying factor. 
According to Garcia, et al. (2008), employees are influential stakeholders whose welfare is internalised 
to a certain extent by top managers through co–determination systems of governance, having small percentages of 
the firm’s total stock in free - float, and making the mangers’ compensation not so focused on current profitability. 
Our aspiration for sound corporate governance can only be met when corporate governance system is designed to 
keep making better off the firm’s workforce (Nwonyuku, 2015c). According to Nwonyuku (2015c), an 
organization should be seen as a system of networking where value is created for all contributors of resources and 
leadership positions are allocated among the direct contributors – investors, employees, credit facilitators, 
customers, and suppliers, and that none of these parties should allow the influence of outsiders to distort the value-
synergy effect of the firm. Thus, the three key participants in the corporate process should be the board of directors 
(representative of investors), management, and the other employees, that can communicate directly with each other 
within and outside the confines of the board to share critical information about the business of the corporation. 
Therefore, in order to maximize corporate value with ease and certainty, all legitimate parties should be given 
equal opportunity for growth without any element of bigotry. According to Nwonyuku (2015c), this is achievable 
through inclusive leadership arrangement that centres on: Transparency (T), Empowerment (E), Accountability 
(A), Courage (C) and Humility (H), this is, “TEACH” Principle of inclusiveness. These inclusive leadership traits 
tend to trigger intrinsic energy that will influence employees’ behaviour to generate exceedingly high performance. 
It is when the employee feels that his interest is being internalized in the organizational structure that the 
corresponding and lasting happiness will yield the desired intrinsic value that when merged with the investor’s 
value will produce the desired and sustainable performance for the firm within the shortest possible time 
(Nwonyuku, 2015c). The value–synergy approach therefore believes that where the behavioural factor of every 
resource provider is considered, ethical consideration will be high; as a result, religious, social, and cultural divide 
or other form of bias relationship will be shun in the course of networking every legitimate resource provider. This 
suggests that value-synergy promotes for diversity and competence of human factor of production that will later 
grow to become board member following excellent performance and contribution in the growth of the firm. 
Value–synergy approach considers that the employees should be adopted and incorporated into the 
leadership structure of the firm as an intrinsic value provider and allocates them with equal opportunity to reach 
to the highest echelon of the organization. This approach also believes that resources must come together to form 
and run an organization. That by mere promoting the shareholders’ value alone is quite unfair and undesirable. To 
ensure full protection and security of the corporation, and the financial markets at large, the employee protection 
and security must also be sought for. As a result, the concept of value–synergy does not recognize much oversight 
function from external environment in the form of non–executive directors. Instead large size of top management 
team is encouraged. The implication is that large board composition is discouraged since every direct stakeholder 
should have the full cover of security, which is in turn reflected as together, everyone ensures that the corporation 
is secured from expropriation attempt. This is on the premise that: An injury to the business is an injury to all. 
Accordingly, everyone feels happy and shows the sense of belongingness by going extra-mile to ensure the lasting 
success of the business. Thus, an outsider is seen as a distortion and distraction in the governance system. Hence, 
board composition tends to be less effective and shows negative correlation with firm performance under this 
perspective. In the same manner, large board size is discouraged by the postulation since there will be less 
monitoring and supervision efforts. In this case, agency problem and agency costs tend to be minimal while 
employees’ welfare and the security of the corporation tend to increase. This, it does by building trust, facilitating 
personality growth and development through constant training and development, creation of leadership position 
for the employees, consultation, cooperation, improved human relations, collective responsibility and adoption of 
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modern organizational and behavioural models. When this assumption is upheld, corporate governance practice 
will no longer be seen on the basis of enforcement or compulsion, but it will be adopted in an intrinsic manner. 
Williamson (1964) points out on the manner in which personal interests influenced decisions. Accordingly, his 
thesis conflicted with the traditional view assumed in accounting theory that the interests of shareholders and 
managers are joined in the maximization of shareholders’ wealth. This view of Williamson might be old and 
unimaginable, but its content is beginning to be realizable as owners’ value begins to merge with the employee’s 
intrinsic value to yield value–synergy effect (Nwonyuku 2015c). Accordingly, to regain the confidence of financial 
markets, a revolutionary approach to corporate governance is necessary (Tipgos and Keefe, 2004). 
 
2.8.0 Profitability as a Measure of Firm Performance 
Tailab (2014) identifies two kinds of performance measurements to include: Financial Performance and Non-
financial performance. According to him, profitability is one of the ways financial performance can be measured. 
In the view of Omondi and Muturi (2013), profitability can be used as a proxy for financial performance. Usually, 
financial performance indicators could include profitability, efficiency, leverage and liquidity. Also, the key 
indicators that may be selected to measure financial performance of companies are functions of investigator’s 
interest and availability of data, among other factors. This research work tends to measure firm performance based 
on those financial performance measurements that are strategically and functionally important to the success of 
the selected companies. In that order, the research would measure financial performance of the firms by focusing 
on profitability. Profitability indicates the efficiency and effectiveness with which management used the resources 
of the company to earn profit and create value to shareholders. Profitability therefore is the measurement of board 
of directors’ (management’s) financial performance in the utilization of company’s available resources (physical, 
material, and human resources) in generating returns to the owners on their investment in the business. In its simple 
term, profitability is the capacity of the persons charged with the responsibility to direct and control the affairs of 
a corporation to generate profits from the assets base of the company. It is the measure of the rate of return from 
the assets or capital employed at a given period of time. This measurement is performed using some key indicators 
known as profitability ratios. According to Owolabi, Obiakor and Okwu (2011), “profitability ratios are used to 
evaluate the management’s ability or efficiency to create earnings from revenue – generating bases within the 
organization.” In the context of this study, the profitability position of a firm is measured using the return on equity 
and net assets per share.   
2.8.1 Relevance of Profitability Measurement  
Profitability indices are becoming a basic barometer for benchmarking corporate governance practices and for 
evaluating compliance levels. Profitability is the reference standard for operating performance. It provides the base 
for the assessment of overall business performance. High profitability therefore implies increase in shareholders 
wealth. Profitability measurement is necessary to measure the financial performance of management. It is a central 
component of corporate governance system. Profitability measure also motivates managers and employees at all 
levels of the organization to strive to meet organization goals. It is therefore a key element for motivating 
individuals in an organization. Drucker (1968) observes that it is unfortunate that the word “profit” is looked upon 
as a term of abuse since some firms always want to maximize profits at the cost of employees, customers and 
society. According to him, except such infrequent cases, it is a fact that sufficient profits must be earned to sustain 
the operations of the business to be able to obtain funds from investors for expansion and growth and to contribute 
towards the social overheads for the welfare of the society. Pandey (2010) adds that a company should earn profits 
to survive and grow over a long period of time. Profitability indicators are important to measure the operating 
efficiency of the company. Besides management of the company, creditors and owners are also interested in the 
profitability of the firm. Creditors want to get interest and repayment of principal regularly. Owners want to get a 
required rate of return of their investment. This is possible only when the company earns enough profits (Pandey, 
2010:594). Profitability measurement is useful in making important business decisions. Shareholders use it to 
make investment decisions based on their analysis. Potential investors need it to weigh the viability of investing 
in a company. Investors may predict future dividends based on the profitability measurement of a company. 
Employees use profitability measurement to determine the effects that they may have on future pay and job security. 
Competitors compare their profitability measurement with rival companies in the same industry and with related 
size to learn and develop strategies to improve their operations. Also, governments require profitability 
measurement to determine the correctness of tax declare in the tax returns.  
 
2.10.0 Relationship between Corporate Governance and Profitability of Firms 
There has been an intuition that a relationship exists between corporate governance and profitability of firms. 
Theoretical frameworks as well as regulatory agencies of corporate governance have emphasized deeply on the 
association between corporate governance practice and firm profitability. Conceptually, progression in corporate 
governance suggests possible improvement in firm profitability. Aggarwal (2013) observes that considerable 
theoretical and empirical researches have been done globally to study the relationship between corporate 
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governance and corporate profitability. Eisenhofer (2010) states broadly the conclusion has been that “Good 
Governance Does Pay”. Selvaggi and Upton (2008) stated that good corporate governance causes good firm 
performance.  Oteh (2013) also confirmed that a published on the link between Corporate Governance and 
Organizational Performance found strong relationships for a number of corporate variables and firm performance 
measures. The persistent corporate failures that occurred over the past few years are hence, sufficiently enough to 
have become evidence that corporate profitability is a core element of corporate governance. 2011 SEC code 
confirmed that weak corporate governance has been responsible for some recent corporate failures in Nigeria. The 
aftermath of this position shows that a relationship does exist between system of corporate management and 
corporate survivability. It has shown that without high and steady stream of earnings, a company will not be able 
to survive any corporate shake-up. Firm profitability is hence, “a life wire instrument for evaluating, monitoring 
managerial and measuring performance of directors including the overall roles of the Board in maintaining the 
wheel of an entity” (Nwonyuku, 2012a:5). Accordingly, the overwhelming effect of corporate governance on the 
profitability suggests that, there is a strong tie between these two different variables. In spite of this, Pandey (2011) 
has noted that conclusive evidence connecting good governance to good performance has been lacking and the 
existing studies have yielded mixed results. Mani and Sreedharan (2004) also confirm that the conclusiveness of 
studies varies across countries. It is therefore surprising given that many academic investigations did not report 
statistical relationships between the variables (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998; Nickell, et al, 1997; Heracleous, 
2001; Barkema and Gomez – Mejia, 1998; Michael, at al., 2006). And in some other studies, researchers found 
that there were indications of negative connections between corporate governance and firm performance, as well 
as mixed results that made the studies inconclusive. Oluwafemi, at al. (2013), also confirmed that empirical 
evidence on the relationship between corporate governance and performance is mixed. Different analogies selected 
from empirical results are considered. Drobertz, Schillhofer, and Zimmermann (2003) explore the relationship 
between firm – level corporate governance and firm performance and suggest that good corporate governance 
leads to higher firm valuation (performance), hence, investors are willing to pay a premium and bad corporate 
governance is punished in terms of valuation discounts. Balasubramanium, et al. (2008) found a positive 
association between India Corporate Governance Index and Tobin’s Q Value (used as proxy for market value of 
firm) and further this relationship was stronger for more profitable firms and firms with higher growth prospects. 
Gompers, et al. (2003) and Sachs (2007) found that highly governed companies significantly outperform the 
investments made in poorly governed companies. In Tanko and Kolawole (2007), a study conducted by MCkinsey 
(2003) found that 80% of the respondents would pay a premium for well governed companies. The research has 
been able to capture a perceived interest of investors that are willing to pay premium for good corporate governance. 
Thus, investors tend to favour companies that are perceived to be well-governed. Aggarwal (2013a) concludes that 
corporate governance has a positive and significant relationship with financial performance. Similarly, Brown and 
Caylor (2004) and Aggarwal (2013b) found positive association between corporate governance scores and 
financial performance of firm. Governance Metrics International and Byun (2006) found that companies with 
higher governance ratings enjoyed higher profits and returns. Mani and Sreedharan (2004) found that superior 
corporate governance practices of firm are positively and significantly correlated to market valuation of firm. 
Klapper and Love (2003) report that better corporate governance is highly correlated with better operating 
performance. Van de Velde, et al. (2005) observed that portfolios with above – average governance scores 
outperformed the portfolios with below – average governance scores. Ashaugh–Skaife and Lafond (2006) 
discovered that firms with higher corporate governance scores demonstrate lower risk to investor, and thus, enjoy 
lower cost of capital. Black, Jang and Kim (2003) provide empirical evidence that there is a positive correlation 
between corporate governance and firm performance. Drobertz (2004) also finds that higher corporate governance 
rating is related to high performance. 
However, the works of Heracleous (2001) in Tanko and Kolawole (2007); Yermack (1996); Claessens, 
et al. (1999); Klapper and Love (2002); Gompers, et al. (2003); and Black, et al. (2003) reported inconclusive 
results as their findings. Heracleous (2001) concludes that, studies have failed to find any convincing connection 
between the ‘best practice’ in corporate governance and organizational performance. More so, Barkema and 
Gomez-Mejia (1998) in Tanko and Kalawole (2007) argue that firms governance structure play no significant role 
in the study of CEO and performance of firm. Also a study conducted by Michael, et al. (2006), concludes that 
there is no significant relationship between the governance control mechanism and firm performance. 
Chidambaram, et al. (2006) found no significant performance difference between firms with good governance 
changes and firms with bad governance changes and thus, rejected the hypothesis that better governance leads to 
better financial performance. This result is consistent with those of Core, et al (2006); and Statman and Gluskhov 
(2009), who found no significant relationship between corporate governance and firm performance. More so, Azim 
(2012) finding suggests a mixed and inconclusive result of the relationship between corporate governance and 
profitability of firms. Mukherjee and Ghosh (2004) found that there is no significant relationship between 
corporate governance and corporate financial performance. More so, the inventory of empirical studies on 
corporate governance and firm profitability shows inconsistent results (Roth and O’ Donnell, 1996; Long, et al. 
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2.12.0 Review of Empirical Studies  
The link between corporate governance and profitability has been strongly discussed in almost all the developed 
and developing economies. While many results have shown the evidence that corporate governance is relevant to 
firm’s profitability because it provides the policies, principles and procedures through which the corporate value 
is maximized. There are some other empirical findings that demonstrate negative and inconclusive results of the 
relationship between corporate governance and profitability of firms. This paper thus, aimed at consolidating such 
reliance on the use of profitability to determine the performance of corporate governance of food and beverages 
firms in Nigeria. 
2.12.1 Review of Empirical Studies in Other Countries 
A review of the empirical evidence on the impact of board size on performance shows mixed results. A study 
conducted by Kashif (2008) on comparison of corporate governance and firm performance in developing Malaysia 
and developed Austrian Financial Markets indicates that board size is positively associated with the performance 
surrogate – return on equity. A similar study conducted by Zubaidah, Nurmala, and Kamaruzaman (2009) in 
Malaysia also showed the same result. Dehaene, et al. (2001), find that board size is positively related to company 
performance. The regression results of the relationship between board size and firm performance investigated by 
Tornyeva and Wereko (2012) indicates a statistically positive but weak relationship between board size and return 
on equity (ROE). According to them, the result implies that larger boards are better, thus, the larger the board, the 
better the performance of the company. This position is premised on the assumption that larger boards are 
constituted with members from different backgrounds that bring to the board different skills and professional 
expertise. This would facilitate better decision making and place the board in a better position to monitor the 
activities of management. The result also gives support to the resource dependence theory that believes that 
directors are not burden and thus should not be seen as source of company expropriation of funds and increasing 
agency costs. However, the research conducted by Chiang 2005) shows that there is a negative but insignificant 
relationship between board of directors’ size and operating performance measures of return on equity (ROE). More 
so, financial ratios related to profitability   and operating efficiency appear to decline as board size grows. In 
Malaysia, Amran (2011) studied the relationship between board characteristics and performance of firms using 
panel data methodology, and the result reveals that board size has a significant negative relationship with firm 
performance. In Ghana, Adusei (2011) investigation of the relationship between board structure and firm 
performance using panel data reveals a negative association between board size and profitability of firms. The 
finding implies that as size of firms’ board of directors decreases its profitability increases. The implication of this 
finding is that, companies with large boards appear to use assets less efficiently and earn less profit. Connelly and 
Limpaphayon (2004) find that board size does not have any relation with firm performance. Aljifri and Moustafa 
(2007) employed cross-sectional regression analysis technique to find out the impact of board characteristics on 
performance of firms in United Arab Emirates; and the result reveals that board size has an insignificant impact 
on performance of firms. Finally, the results of Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) are inconclusive. 
Empirical evidence available on the relationship between board composition and firm profitability shows 
mixed results. Dehaene, et al. (2001), find that the percentage of outside directors (board composition) is positively 
related to the performance of Belgian firms. Connelly and Limpaphayom (2004) find that board composition has 
a positive relation with profitability of firms in Thailand. In Pakistan, Ibrahim, et al. (2010), study the impact of 
corporate governance on performance of Pakistan chemical and pharmaceutical companies; and the results of the 
investigation indicate that board independence has positive impact on return on equity. Rosenstein and Wyatt 
(1990) find a positive stock price reaction at the announcement of the appointment of an additional outside director, 
implying that the proportion of outside directors’ affects shareholders’ wealth. However, Tornyeva and Wereko 
(2012) found that board independence has a negative and weak relationship with return on equity. Further in Tanko 
and Kolawole (2007), a study conducted by Dalton, et al. (1998) based on variables like operationalization of 
board composition and the nature of the performance indicators conclude that there is no evidence of a substantive 
relationship. 
Empirical findings of the relationship between board gender diversity and firm profitability show mixed 
results. In the United States of America, Erhardt, et al. (2003) results show that board gender diversity have a 
positive correlation with firm financial performance; and the implication is that, an increase in the number of 
female directors on the boards will turn out to improve the firm profitability since it will expand the culture, rules, 
structures, processes, knowledge, skills, expertise and competence of the boards in ensuring efficient operation of 
the business entity. Bathula (2008) study shows that gender diversity was positively associated with firm 
performance. Rose (2007) also studied the impact of female board representation on firm financial performance 
of selected quoted Danish companies and the result shows that gender diversity does have significant impact on 
financial performance. According to the findings of Luckerath–Rovers (2011) in Netherlands, the presence of one 
or more female directors on the board relates positively and significantly to return on equity. A striking result that 
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follows from her study is that higher return on equity is consistently and statistically significant for companies 
with women on the board than for companies without women on the board. These results suggest that on average 
the presence of women on the board is a distinctive feature of companies that perform better (Luckerath–Rovers, 
2011). In general, Chiang (2005) finds that companies with good corporate governance have a significant positive 
relationship with operating performance measures in ROE. 
2.12.2 Review of Empirical Studies in Nigeria 
Relationship between corporate governance and profitability has been studied by many researchers in Nigeria. The 
result of the study conducted by Okougbo (2011) on corporate governance and firm performance of 52 listed non-
financial companies in Nigeria using panel estimation based on the Generalized Least Square regression of fixed 
effects shows that the relationship between board size and return on equity is positive and significant. The result 
of Mutalib (2012) study of corporate governance and the performance of food, beverage and tobacco industry in 
Nigeria indicates that board size has significant impact on net assets per share. The result of empirical study carried 
out by Babatunde and Olaniran (2009) on the linkage between corporate governance mechanism and performance 
of corporate firms in Nigeria shows that there is a positive relationship between board size and return on equity. 
Tanko and Kolawole (2007) result indicates that board size has a positive and significance relationship with firm 
performance measured by return on equity. Result from the study conducted by Uadiale (2010) indicates that there 
is strong positive association between board size and corporate financial performance – return on equity. In a 
sample of 248 companies employed to study the impact of corporate governance on firm’s performance in Nigeria 
using panel data random effect analysis, Dabor, et al. (2015) result indicates that there is a positive but statistically 
insignificant relationship between board size and return on equity. All the results indicate that increase in board 
size would increase the performance of the firm. This confirms the view that larger boards are better for corporate 
performance because members have a range of expertise to help make better decisions. Also, the findings indicate 
the need for increase in board size and support the view that larger boards are better for corporate performance 
because members have a range of expertise to help make better decisions, and are harder for a powerful CEO of 
the firm to dominate. However, Sanda, et al. (2005) studied the linkage between corporate governance mechanisms 
and financial performance of Nigerian firms using pooled ordinary least squares regression analysis technique; 
and the result shows that board size has a negative relationship with return on equity. Mutalib (2012) result also 
indicates that there is no significant impact of board size in relation to return on equity of firms in food, beverage 
and tobacco sector of Nigerian economy. 
On board composition, Uadiale (2010) empirical evidence available shows that there is a positive 
association between outside directors sitting on the board and corporate financial performance measures - return 
on equity. Tanko and Kolawole (2007) study shows that board composition has a positive and significant 
association with firm performance in terms of return on equity. This means that the more outsiders there are on a 
company’s board, the better the performance in terms of return on equity. The implication is that when a board is 
deemed independent, performance of companies becomes better. The results show that where there are more 
outside directors, they will support the beneficial monitoring and advisory functions thereby strengthening the 
monitoring of the shareholders fund. In this regard, the composition of the board of directors should be more 
outsiders. However, there are also fair amount of empirical findings that tend not to support the positive 
relationship of board composition with firm profitability. Dabor, et al. (2015) result indicates an insignificant 
negative relationship between board composition and return on equity. The finding shows that improved 
performance of firm is not dependent on increasing the number of board composition. This implies that when there 
are more external board members, performance of firms tend to be worse off and recommend decrease in board 
composition. Oluwafemi, et al. (2013), identify that empirical research results of impact of outside directors on 
firm performance are mixed. According to them, there appears to be generally no empirical evidence that the 
existence of outside directors is correlated with firm performance.  On the side of gender diversity, Result from a 
study conducted by Dabor, et al. (2015), show insignificant negative relationship between board gender diversity 
and return on equity.                                                                                               
 
3.0 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Research Design 
The research theme is the determination of the influence of corporate governance on profitability of food and 
beverages firms in Nigeria. The study is based on qualitative and quantitative analyses. The qualitative analysis is 
based on the theoretical, regulatory and previous studies of corporate governance. The quantitative analysis is 
based on data collected from the sample size drawn from the study population. The population of the study is 23 
listed food and beverages firms, and sample size of eight (8) was drawn using random sampling technique on the 
basis of census to provide answers to the research questions and test formulated hypotheses. The timing of the 
study spanned from 2004 to 2014, which is a period of 11 years. The choice for this period is to determine the post 
effect of the code of corporate governance on performance which was introduced in Nigeria for the first time in 
2003 by Nigerian Securities and Exchange Commission. The research methods are mainly adopted from four 
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previous studies by Okougbo (2011), Tornyeva and Wereko (2012), Uadiale (2010) and Dabor, et al. (2015). More 
so, secondary data collection technique was employed using mainly annual reports and accounts as well as other 
documents of the selected companies. Also, in order to provide answers to the research questions and to test the 
formulated hypotheses as well as to control variance as validly, objectively, and accurately as possible, the study 
employed basic descriptive statistics to determine the measures of central tendencies and dispersion and inferential 
statistics to ascertain the casual linkages and to predict the future outcomes of the dependent variables. In order to 
achieve the research objectives, the study employed board structure indicators found in Okougbo (2011), Tornyeva 
and Wereko (2012), and Dabor, et al. (2015) that was used to predict various profitability measures in a set of 
correlation tests, using firm size as a control variable. The authors used correlation tests followed by a panel data 
analysis of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) multiple linear regression models to carry out inferential statistics and 
analyse the collected data. Accordingly, the use of this model was to enable the control of independent variables 
to forestall the operation of extraneous and unwanted sources of systematic variance. Thus, “the research design 
criterion is pertinent to ensure generalizability, validity and reliability of the study” (Okereke, 2001: 59 – 60) 
should different samples are drawn from the target population for the same purpose. 
 
3.2.0 Sample Size and Sampling Techniques of the Study 
From the population frame of 23 listed food and beverages companies in Nigeria as at 31 December, 2014, a 
sample size of eight (8) companies representing about 35 per cent of listed food and beverages firms in Nigeria. 
The sampling procedure employed is the census strategy of random sampling technique. This technique is 
preferred to others because it gives equal opportunity for every element to be selected from the population frame. 
In view of the outlined objectives of this research, certain contributions have been satisfied by firms selected for 
the final analyses. Therefore, three companies were eliminated because of inadequate financial and non-financial 
information. Five firms were excluded because their shares were not constantly traded for the time this 
investigation was undertaken. In a similar manner, five firms were not included because the shares of the 
companies were not listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) prior to or as at 31st December, 2004. Finally, 
two companies were eliminated because of being extremely diversified or conglomerated and the use of their 
annual reports and accounts could distort the entire result. Following the sample size of eight firms selected for 
the period of 11 years ranging from 2004 to 2014, it is therefore obvious that the study employed 88 data 
observations.  
 
3.3.0 Methods of Data Collection 
There are several techniques of data collection, namely, the use of interview, use of documents and use of 
questionnaire. This study employed the use of documents. This is following the shortfalls in the other techniques. 
Particularly, the use of interview and questionnaire could involve time consuming, energy sapping and expensive 
to carry out. Also, there could be communication gap and electric power, internet and telephone interruptions. 
They involve skills like maintenance and establishment of rapport and high confidentiality (Nwonyuku, 2005: 78). 
Further, Nwonyuku (2005) notes that they do not cover the entire population due to it is only the knowledgeable 
respondents will respond to it; data-blank mode questionnaire are difficult to code and to carry out statistical 
analysis; responses could at times be shallow and therefore, unreliable. It could face the problem of unreturned 
questionnaire as well as the possibility of misinterpretation of the questions. More so, the researcher may be unable 
to relate the questions to the research questions, objectives and hypotheses, thus, losing the validity of the research 
result. It is as against the backdrop that this investigation employed the use of documents coupled with observation 
and measurement as the method of data gathering. This method is cheap, readily available and saves time. 
Document is an already existing data material that is, secondary data instrument, and could be sourced from 
textbooks, newspapers, journals, magazines, workshops, seminars, conferences and meetings (Nwonyuku, 
2005:78); from publications like company’s annual general meeting reports and accounts, internet sources, articles, 
editorials and previous research works. More so, the method gives stability, dependability, predictability and 
precision of the collected data as well as ensures reliability and validity of research objectives, questions and 
hypotheses outcome. As a result, the findings from this investigation could be generalized and stood to the test of 
time.  
 
3.4.1 Source of Data Gathering 
In any social science research, data as an important component for investigation is collected from basically two 
sources: primary and secondary. While the primary source of data involves the use of methods like questionnaires 
and interviews which may involve direct contact from persons and/or areas involve; and consequently, it is 
surrounded by the problems associated with questionnaires and interviews techniques. The secondary data involves 
the use of documents method of data collection. This study employed the secondary source of data gathering 
because of its convenience, sufficiency, availability and accuracy over the primary sources of data collection. The 
data for the research was obtained from databases that can be described as external secondary sources (Stewart 
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and Kamins, 1992), meaning existing sources of information collected by others and archived in some form. 
Stewart and Kamins (1992) point out that secondary source of data collection offer a relatively quick and 
inexpensive solution for research compared to primary sources of data. According to Bajpai (2011), this is 
particularly useful for studies where collecting the required data would be challenging or when the researcher 
needs easily accessible company information, such as sales or revenue information about companies.  
3.4.2 Instruments for Data Collection  
The research employs quantitative data collection instruments since the study used numbers in the form of financial 
ratio. The instrument adopted to collect the quantitative data is the Nigerian Stock Exchange Fact book 2013/14, 
African Financial portals and directly from the websites of the selected companies where the annual reports and 
accounts of the companies were extracted for the periods covered in this study. The three instruments of data 
gathering for this study indicated as the most reliable and relevant, as they are objective and independent providers 
that gather information from various sources of publicly listed companies, such as annual reports and accounts, 
news and publications. The data collections cover the time period and publication of interest and the risk of bias 
is low compared to instruments of data collection from primary sources of data collection methods. This is 
particularly important as corporate governance is a complex area and there is no standard way of measuring 
corporate governance performance. 
3.4.3 Reliability and Validity of Instruments for Data Collection 
Nunnally (1978) describes reliability as “the extent to which results are consistent over time and provide an 
accurate representation of the total population under study.” In other words, reliability is the consistency and 
stability of findings, which enables findings to be replicated (Burns and Burns, 2008: 410). Nunnally (1978) and 
Vaus (2011) note that, in practice a measure is reliable when it can be used to reproduce the same result when 
repeated on occasions. Burns and Burns (2008) emphasize that accuracy and stability of a measure are the two 
most important characteristics of reliability. The reliability and validity in secondary data are mostly functions of 
the method and the sources by which the data were collected (Lewis, et al. 2009). In the previous sections, the 
instruments for data collection and analysis were mentioned and discussed to include: observation, measurement 
and documents. The use of these instruments all through this study were consistent, accurate, predictable, and 
stable to ensure that they measured what they purported to measure in the context of the study. Thus, relevant 
concepts, characteristics, regulatory and theoretical frameworks of dependent and independent variables as well 
as control variables were explored to show representativeness or sampling adequacy of this discourse. The 
coverage was adequate and qualitative enough to address the research problems, answer research questions, and 
to achieve the desired research objectives. This was accomplished through frequent reference to related and 
relevant literature both from international and domestic research works “based on the similarity in research design 
and instruments for data analysis.” As a result, this study is based on methods used by Okougbo (2011), Uadiale 
(2010), Tornyeva and Wereko (2012) and Dabor, et al. (2015), which proves the reliability of the results and the 
research design. Nonetheless, this research is still an individual study that has been adapted from other relevant 
studies, rather than a reproduction of previous studies. Further investigation would be needed to confirm the 
reliability of the results. More so, Lewis, et al. (2009), state that reliability of secondary data is related to the 
reputation of the source. The validity and reliability tests of the research instruments were “enhanced with the use 
of only published annual reports and accounts of selected companies” obtained from well-recognized sources. As 
Nigerian Stock Exchange Fact books and African Financials Portal are the leading business data providers, the 
source can be confirmed as reliable and the original data sources from Nigerian Stock Exchange Fact books and 
African Financial Portal are often verified by third-parties, as the sample consists of listed companies. More so, 
the data analysis instruments employed in the study have theoretical background of financial or economic 
encumbrances and have been used by previous researchers in the same and related field of study; hence this enabled 
the researcher to compare methodology and findings from past studies with the result obtained from the data 
analysis instruments – panel data model and descriptive statistics. To this end, it is assumed that different measures 
of the same empirical construct should yield fairly highly related result, where all factors remain unchanged. 
On the other hand, validity could be either internally or externally measured or even the both. According 
to Burns and Burns (2008), internal validity refers to the capacity and appropriateness of a research design to 
assess the casual conclusions it purports to measure. It is the extent to which the structure of research design 
enables us to draw unambiguous conclusions from the results (Vaus, 2001: 28). Vaus (2011), refers external 
validity to “the extent to which results from a study can be generalized beyond the particular study.” It means 
whether the outcomes of a sample are transferrable to a population (Burns and Burns, 2008). As stated earlier, 
Nigerian Stock Exchange Fact books and African Financials Portal were identified as the most appropriate data 
source for this study, and fulfilled all the assessment criteria. In addition, there is a low risk of bias or error in the 
values, as data have been provided by independent sources rather than collected by the researcher. Therefore, the 
internal validity of the research is high and by extension to the external validity, the result from the sampled 
companies can be transferred to the entire food and beverages firms in Nigeria. Even though certain assumptions 
can be drawn from the results and other similar studies, the findings primarily apply to the 23 listed food and 
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beverages companies in Nigeria out of about 206 publicly quoted companies and 1.371 million companies (both 
private and public) in Nigeria as at the time of this study. This according to Burns and Burns (2008) refer to a low 
“population validity,” as the sample is less likely to provide results that can be transferred to a larger population. 
This is not to say that secondary sources do not have strong external validity, which improves the generalizability 
of findings to a larger population. 
 
3.5.0 Instruments for Data Analysis 
The econometric instruments for data analysis adopted in this study include the use of basic descriptive statistics. 
Also, inferential statistics tools employed for analysing the underlying statistical tests like the regression tests and 
the test of correlation is Multiple Linear Regression Analysis which is estimated with the Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) in a Panel Data manner to explain the impact of corporate governance on profitability of firms in Nigeria, 
while the test of correlation measures the degree of association of the corporate governance characteristics with 
the profitability indicators employed for the study. This model is also referred to as Balanced Panel Data Analysis 
because of its ability to use cross – sectional and time series data. These statistical instruments have been used by 
numerous researchers for many years and have been confirmed reliable (Dabor, et al, 2015; Tornyeva and Wereko, 
2012; Okougbo, 2011; Velnampy, 2013; Kajola, 2008; Aggarwal, 2013a & b). Multiple linear regression is a 
technique in which more than one independent or explanatory variable is used to predict the value of the dependent 
variable (Burns & Burns, 2008; Eye & Schuster, 1996). More so, OLS multiple linear regression is the most widely 
used type of regression for predicting the value of one or more than one dependent variables from the values of 
two or more independent variables because, it gives equal importance to all the items in the time series, the older 
and the more recent.  
Panel Data Analysis (PDA) involves the pooling of observations on cross – section of units over several 
time periods and provides results that are simply not detectable in pure cross – sections or pure time – series studies 
(Tornyeva and Wereko, 2012). The panel nature of the data permits the estimation of dynamic “corporate 
governance” models over the business cycle at the level of the individual firm, to test both the persistence and 
cyclical of firm profitability (McDonald, 1999). Panel data model allows controlling for variables which cannot 
be observed or measured or for variables that change over time and not cross entities, and therefore, this approach 
has advantages compared to the cross – sectional approach often used in financial research (Pratheepan, 2014:5). 
The model is grounded in financial or economic reasoning, with variables that are appropriate functional forms for 
their nature. It has specifications that are parsimonious and it is in compliance with the regression assumptions. 
Panel data regression provides better results since it increases sample size and reduces the problem of degree of 
freedom. According Solomon, et al. (2012), the use of panel regression would avoid the problem of 
multicollinearity, aggregation bias and endogeneity problems. However, the pooled data analysis neglects the 
heterogeneity effects in the sampled firms. In spite of this the panel data was preferred as it provides better results. 
More so, it has been tested out-of-sample before applying them to decisions. Based on the above, it is therefore a 
convenient method of analysing the collected data for the purpose of achieving the research objectives. Thus, all 
data were prepared and statistically analysed using econometrics software applications of E-view version 8.0. On 
the aspect of establishing whether correlation exists among the independent variables, three violations of 
correlation coefficient estimate may occur. They are hetroskedasticity, serial correlation and multicollinearity. This 
study adopts multicollinearity test. Kothari (2004) notes that in multiple regression analysis, the regression 
coefficient become less reliable as the degree of correlation between independent variables increases. If there is a 
high degree of correlation between one independent variable and another independent variable, the problem of 
multicollinearity, or simply called collinearity will occur. Its presence shows correlation coefficient estimates to 
be consistently high between the independent variables, but imprecise and unreliable. Another indicator to know 
its occurrence is the presence of a significant F – test but with no or low significant t – tests. 
3.5.1 Model Specification 
Pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with Multiple Linear Regression Analysis in the panel data framework is 
used in the study to investigate the nature of relationship between corporate governance and profitability of food 
and beverages firms in Nigeria. This covers eight (8) firms for the time period of 11 years spanning from 2004 to 
2014. Econometrically, the set up to investigate the relation between corporate governance and firms profitability 
variables is expressed in equation form; the prediction model can be specified in a general form as:  
Yit = β0 + βnXit + Ԑit   
Where:  
Yit = Dependent variable of firm, i in time, t (firm profitability indicators); 
β0 = Constant term or intercept of the explanatory variable regression line; 
β = Regression coefficient or slope or gradient of the explanatory variable (corporate governance characteristics); 
n = serial number of regression coefficient of the explanatory variables in the prediction model; Xit = Explanatory 
or independent or predicting or regressing variable in the estimation model of firm, i in time, t;  
Ԑit = Error term or residual random element of firm, i in time, t (assumed to have zero (0) mean and independent 
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across time period).  
This estimation model has underlying assumptions to include: 
i. The relationship between the dependent variable, Yit, and the independent variable, Xit is linear.  
ii. The independent or explanatory variable, Xit is not random. Also, no exact linear relation exists between 
two or more of the independent variables. 
iii. The expected value of the error term, Ԑit, conditioned on the independent variable, is zero. 
iv. The variance of the error term, Ԑit, is the same for all observations.  
v. The error term, Ԑit, is uncorrected across observations. 
vi. The error term, Ԑit, is normally distributed.  
Further, by expressing the general prediction equation in the variables under consideration, we have: 
Profitability (PROF) = ƒ (Corporate Governance)    
PROFit =   β0 + βn [(Corporate Governance)it ] + Ԑit    ………………………….. I  
In order to ensure robustness of the model and to reduce specification bias, the prediction model also includes 
control variables, making the general formula to be further represented as: 
PROFit =   β0 + βn [(Corporate Governance + Control variable)it ] + Ԑit  ………….. II 
By specifying the corporate governance into the four characteristics under study: board size (BS), board 
composition (BC), board skills and competence (BSC) and board gender diversity (BGD) as well as the control 
variable included in the study: firm size (FS), we have:     
Profitability (PROF) = ƒ (BS, BC, BSC, BGD, FS).  
If these various mechanisms are substituted in equation II, the prediction model will be restated as specific form 
and represented mathematically as:  
PROFit = β0 + β1BSit + β2BCit + β3BSCit + β4BGDit + β5FSit + Ԑit ……………….III  
Where: 
β1 - β5 = Beta coefficients of the explanatory and control variables (BS, BC, BSC, BGD, FS); 
BSit = a vector of size of board of directors variables of firm, i in time, t; 
BCit = a vector of board composition variables of firm, i in time, t; 
BSCit = a vector of board skills and competence variables of firm, i in time, t; 
BGDit = a vector of board gender diversity variables of firm, i in time, t;  
FSit = a vector of control variables of firm, i in time, t. 
This is also built on the models of previous studies (Kajola, 2008; Tornyeva and Wereko, 2012; Okougbo, 2011; 
Aggarwal, 2013a & 2013b). Since the profitability indicators selected for the study include: return on equity (ROE) 
and net assets per share (NAPS), it therefore follows that, two prediction models would be formed for correlation 
and regression tests to investigate the nature of relationship between corporate governance and profitability of 
firms. Hence, the two specification models for the study can be expressed as: 
ROEit = β0 + β1BSit + β2BCit + β3BSCit + β4BGDit + β5FSit + Ԑit …………………. 1 
NAPSit = β0 + β1BSit + β2BCit + β3BSCit + β4BGDit + β5FSit + Ԑit …………………2 
Where:  
ROEit = Return on equity of firm, i in time, t; 
NAPSit = Net assets per share of firm, i in time, t. 
Where: i and t represent the companies and time period from 2004 to 2014 respectively for the study. The sample 
consists of 88 observations for data from the food and beverages firms in Nigeria ranging from 2004 to 2014, 
which is (8 firms x 11 years = 88). 
3.5.2 Measurements of Variables 
In the course of determining the nature of relationship between corporate governance and profitability of food and 
beverages firms in Nigeria, three variables were employed, which include: Dependent variable, independent 
variable and control variable. 
Measurement of Dependent Variable (Profitability Indicators): 
Return on equity (ROE): This is measured by the ratio of profit after tax and preference dividends to total owners’ 
equity (ordinary share capital plus reserves) for the period. 
ROE = Profit after tax and preference dividends        X 100 %       
             Total owners’ equity (shareholders’ funds) 
Net assets per share (NAPS): This is measured by the proportion of total owners’ equity or shareholders’ fund (net 
assets) to the number of ordinary share capital outstanding in respect for the period. 
NAPS = Total owners’ equity (shareholders’ funds)                                                X 100 kobo. 
               Number of ordinary share capital outstanding in respect for the time 
Measurement of Independent Variable (Corporate Governance Indices) 
Size of the board of directors (BS): This is measured as the natural logarithm of total number of directors serving 
as board members as at the year ended.  BS = Natural Logarithm of total number of board members. Board 
Composition (BC): This represents the proportion of total number of non-executive directors and independent non-
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executive directors serving on the board as at the period ended. It can also be referred to as the ratio of independent 
directors (outside directors) to the total number of board members for the period. 
BC = Total number of outside directors (Non-executive) directors sitting on the board    X 100% 
          Total number of board of Directors for the period 
Board Skills and Competence (BSC): In considering Kolb, et al. (1974) learning cycle, there are four types of 
learners: concrete, activist, theorists and reflectors. Also, Blue Ribbon Panel on healthcare Governance, BRPHG 
(2009) categorizes competencies as threshold and differentiating. Threshold consists of generic knowledge, skills, 
characteristics and behaviours essential to job performance and it is considered as the minimum competence 
necessary for performance on the job and can apply to the same job industry-wide range of activities. According 
to BRPHG (2009), differentiating competencies relate to superior job performance for a specific type of 
organization. Katz and Kahn (1978) identity technical, human relations and conceptual skills as must possessed 
skills for strategic level. This study measures board skills and competence on the basis of threshold competencies, 
which include only the theorists and activists. It does not consider technical and human relations skills of the board 
members. Following the conceptual or threshold competencies basis, board skills and competence = Number of 
directors sitting on the board with minimum of first degree or its equivalent and/or professional qualifications 
(conceptual skills of learning) to total number of directors on the board as at the period ended. It is measured in 
per cent. Board Gender Diversity (BGD): This is used as a proxy for board diversity characteristic in this study. It 
represents the number of female directors serving on the board of a company to the total number of board of 
directors in that company as at the period ended. According to Marlin and Geiger (2012), board gender diversity 
is calculated as the number of female directors divided by the total number of all directors on a given period. 
BGD = Number of women directors serving on the board    X 100% 
             Total number of board of directors 
Measurement of control variable 
Firm Size (FS): This control variable adopted the measurement used by Ganiyu and Abiodun (2012). It is measured 
by the natural logarithm of total assets of the firm. This is the size of the firm measured by the value of its asset 
base. For the regression analysis, natural logarithm of the assets was taken because the values are widely spread. 
The essence of the control variable is to give recognition to the fact that the profitability of firms especially, food 
and beverages firms may be influenced by several factors other than corporate governance characteristics. 
FS = Natural logarithm of total assets of the firm for each year ended. 
 
3.6.0 Limitations of the Methodology 
Several problems were encountered in the methodology. They are as follows: 
1. Complete picture of the activities of a firm cannot be given by the financial statements, for instance, the 
strength and weakness of management is completely omitted. 
2. The factors influencing the profitability of a firm in one year may change in another year and thus could 
make trend analysis misleading. 
3. In most cases, there is no uniformity and consistency in the way and manner the companies in the study 
present their annual reports and accounts. 
4. In some companies’ annual reports and accounts, essential components of financial and non-financial 
data are excluded. This makes it difficult to get such data for research purpose. 
Despite these arrays of limitations, the outcome of this study remains reliable and valid for generalization within 
the industry-specific under investigation. 
 
4.0 DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS 
4.1.0 Data Analysis 
In order to achieve the empirical objective of the study, data gathered and presented were analysed basically in 
three different results: the basic descriptive statistics result; correlation result and regression estimates results for 
test of hypotheses.  
4.2.1 Analysis of Basic Descriptive Statistics Result  
The result of the descriptive statistics is as shown in appendix 1, table 1. The report shows that the variables are 
both positively and negatively skewed, and the positive value of the Kurtosis signifies that the regression variables 
are peaked than the Gausian distribution. The Kurtosis values greater than 3 indicates that the variables are 
Leptokutosis only the board size (BS), board composition (BC) and firm size (FS) values of Kurtosis that are less 
than 3 which represents Platykurtic distribution. Further, the analysis of size of the board of directors (BS) is in 
natural logarithm and should be converted to natural number for proper interpretations. The result shows that board 
size reported a mean value of 1.002208, which is equivalent to 10 and implies that on the average the sampled 
food and beverages firms have a board size of ten directors. The board size reported a maximum value of 1.146130, 
which is equal to 14 indicating a maximum board size of 14 directors. Also, the minimum value of board size 
reported is 0.845100, which are 7 directors. The minimum board size as provided by section 4.2 of the 2011 SEC 
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code of corporate governance in Nigeria is five; while the 2015 exposure draft of National Code of Corporate 
Governance for private sectors provided eight members. Subsequently, the selected food and beverages firms’ 
minimum board size of seven exceeded the 2011 code of corporate governance provision of five which fell within 
the time frame of this study and by implication, the food and beverages firms have a sufficient size relative to the 
scale and complexity of the sector. Following the newly drafted exposure code, however, the minimum board size 
of the studied firms should be increased to meet the requirement. The result suggests that on the average, the 
companies considered in this study have moderate board sizes. This is good in respect of the performance of these 
companies because it supports recent thinking about board size and is sufficient to attract external resources 
towards improving corporate profitability. More so, the result of the descriptive statistics shows that the average 
board composition (BC) of the listed food and beverages firms in Nigeria is 69.82%, the minimum is 46.15% and 
the maximum is 85.71%. The 2011 SEC code of corporate governance for public companies in Nigeria provides 
in section 4.3 that the board should comprise a mix of executive and non-executive directors, and the majority of 
board members should be non-executive directors; in the non-executive to executive directors factor of 4:1 implies 
that 80% of board size should be the maximum proportion of board composition. In this sector, the maximum 
board composition is about 86% showing that there is an excessive provision of independent directors serving on 
the board of food and beverages firms in Nigeria this may likely make them to lose focus and exhibit hidden 
directors’ factor, which perhaps could cause increase in agency cost and reduction of profitability. Even the new 
NCCG non-executive director to executive director factor is 7:2 implies 77.78% of board size should be the 
maximum proportion of board composition. This also shows that there is an over recruitment of non-executive 
directors in this sector. The result of descriptive statistics shows that there is an average of 6.49% board gender 
diversity, with the minimum of 0% and maximum of 28.57% representing female directors serving on the boards 
of the listed food and beverages firms in Nigeria. While most other countries have provided in their domestic 
corporate governance codes that at least one female director must serve on the boards of any quoted company in 
their countries in order to promote gender diversity, Nigeria is yet to follow suit. The 2003, 2011 and the newly 
drafted 2015 NCCG for private sectors could not specifically mandate quota for board gender diversity. They 
basically provided that the board should be composed in such a way  as to ensure diversity of experience and 
gender without compromising competence, independence, integrity  and availability of members to attend 
meetings. More so, section 5.12 of NCCG has indicated that companies should establish a policy concerning 
diversity and disclose the policy. Yet, this blank provision is not sufficient to say that the regulators recognize the 
real benefits of board gender diversity mainly in strategic decision making. This could be the reason that the food 
and beverages firms in Nigeria have a very low average of female directors on their boards. Further, the board skill 
and competence result shows 100% on average, minimum and maximum boards members in the sector. All the 
directors on the boards either have a university degree or its equivalent and/or professional qualifications. This 
means that the food and beverages firms in Nigeria recognize the importance of job and behavioural competencies. 
This is as provided in section 4.4 of 2011 code of corporate governance that the members of the board should be 
individuals with upright personal characteristics, relevant core competences and entrepreneurial spirit. Firm size 
value is based on natural logarithm. When converted to natural number, the average total assets employed by the 
sector is ₦40,610,655,540.00, with maximum total assets of ₦300,489,983,600.00 and minimum total assets of 
₦2,569685,654.00. From the side of dependent variables, the companies on average generated return on equity of 
7.29% with maximum of 302.55% and minimum of -2071% respectively. In terms of net assets per share, the 
mean value was ₦13.19 per share, maximum of ₦51.21 per share and minimum of - ₦2.76 per share.  
4.2.2 Correlation Analysis 
Appendix 2, table 2 shows the correlation matrix of test for multicollinearity, which explains the degree of 
closeness among the independent variables. From the result of regression estimate of each dependent variable, 
each of the t-statistics does not have zero  value or very low significant value. Also, the analysis of correlation 
matrix from appendix 2 indicates that there is no high degree of correlation existing between one independent 
variable and another across the firms. This shows that the independent variables are free from multicollinearity 
problem in each of the model; making the regression coefficient becomes very reliable in predicting the 
corresponding dependent variable.  
4.2.3 Analysis of the Results of Regression Estimates 
The result of the pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) regression estimates for prediction model 1 is presented in 
appendix 3, table 3.1. The result helps to explain the empirical relationship between the dependent variable (return 
on equity) and the independent and control variables. The explanatory power of the pooled OLS regression model, 
coefficient of determination or R – square shows that the prediction variables: BS, BC, BSC, and BGD and control 
variable FS reviewed the weak ability to predict profitability proxy – return on equity and accounts for about 5% 
of the cross sectional variations in the dependent variable of ROE. This implies that the remaining 95% variation 
in ROE cannot be explained because it is related to other variables which are not depicted in the model. The 
implication is that there may be number of variables which can have an impact on profitability of food and 
beverages firms that need to be studied. Durbin – Watson statistic test was also carried out to check the auto 
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correction among the independent variables. The Durbin – Watson statistic ranges in value from 0 – 4. A value 
near 2 indicates non-auto correlation. The Durbin – Watson statistic of 2.323135 signifies the absence of auto 
correlation. In this result, the interpretation for level of significance is based on 5 per cent (0.05) critical value. 
Thus, BS has t – statistic value of 1.834223 with an associated probability of 0.0702 reveals that there is a positive 
and insignificant relationship between board size and return on equity. Also, the reported regression coefficient 
values of 4.945574 for BS holds that a unit increase in BS will lead to about 4.95 units increase in ROE with 7 per 
cent probability level. The reported t – statistic value of -0.312521 for BC has probability value of 0.7554 that is 
insignificant for the 5% (0.05) significance level to lead to the conclusion that board composition has a negative 
and weak relationship with return on equity. Further, the coefficient value of -0.669708 for BC means that a unit 
increase in BC will lead to about 0.67 units decrease in ROE with 75.54 per cent probability level. Also, the t – 
statistics value of -1.322723 associated with the reported probability value of 0.1896 for BSC indicates negative 
and insignificant relationship with ROE, and as such, the regression coefficient value of -4.722703 for BSC implies 
that a unit increase in BSC will bring about 4.72 units decrease in ROE with 18.96 per cent probability level. In 
addition, the reported t–statistics of 1.512930 and associated probability of 0.1341 for BGD show a positive and 
statistically insignificant relationship with return on equity to suggest that the observed data is inconsistent with 
the assumption that the null hypothesis is true, and in this respect, the regression coefficient value of 4.761343 for 
BGD means that a unit increase in BGD will lead to about 5 units increase in ROE with 13.41 per cent probability 
level. Subsequently, the t – statistics value of -0.078709 and probability value of 0.9375 for FS reveal that there is 
a negative and weak relationship between FS and ROE, and the reported regression coefficient value of -1.99 for 
FS holds that a unit decrease in FS will bring about 1.99 units increase in ROE. Since the firm size unit in naira is 
in one billion (₦1 billion) and the unit of return on equity is in one naira (₦1), it could mean that ₦1 billion 
decrease in firm size as measured by total assets will lead to ₦1.99 increase in return on equity of the listed food 
and beverages firm in Nigeria. 
Table 3.2 shows the result of the pooled OLS regression estimates for prediction model 2. The result is 
useful in explaining the empirical association between dependent variable (nets assets per share, NAPS) and the 
independent and control variables. R–squared is 0.191389; this implies that 19 per cent of the variations in NAPS 
were insignificantly explained by the variation in the independent and control variables. The remaining 81% is 
explained by other factors outside the independent variables in the model. The reported Durbin – Watson statistics 
value of 2.014231 signifies the absence of auto correlation. The interpretation for significance is based on 5 per 
cent (0.05) critical value. Thus, based on the result, BS with robust reported t – statistic value of 4.038630 and the 
corresponding probability value of 0.0001 is beyond the likelihood of chance. It reveals that there is a positive and 
statistically significant relationship between BS and NAPS, and as such, the regression coefficient value of 
50.01826 for BS suggests that a unit increase in BS will lead to about 50 units increase in net assets per share 
(NAPS) with 0 per cent probability level. The reported t-statistics value of 0.355852 and the associated probability 
value of 0.7229 for BC indicate that there is a positive and statistically insignificant relationship between BC and 
NAPS, also, the regression coefficient value of 3.5021719 for BC holds that a unit increase in BC will cause about 
3.5 units increase in NAPS with 72.29 per cent probability level. The reported t-statistics value of -2.556449 and 
the associated probability value of 0.0124 for BSC show negative and statistically insignificant association 
between BSC and NAPS; in this respect, the reported regression coefficient value of -41.92652 for BSC holds that 
a unit increase in BSC will cause about 41.93 units decrease in NAPS with 1.24 per cent probability level. BGD 
has reported t-statistic value of 2.822992 and corresponding probability value of 0.0060, signifying that positive 
and statistically significant relationship between board gender diversity (BGD) and net assets per share (NAPS); 
in this regard, the reported regression coefficient value of 40.80849 holds that a unit increase in BGD will lead to 
40 units increase in NAPS with 0.6 per cent probability level. FS has reported t-statistic value of -0.841210 with 
associated probability value of 0.4026 indicating that there is a negative and statistically insignificant relationship 
between FS and NAPS, and the reported regression coefficient value of -9.78 for FS reveals that a unit increase in 
FS will lead to 9.78 units decrease in NAPS. Since the firm size unit in naira is equal to one billion (₦1billion) 
and the unit of NAPS is in one naira (₦1), it means that ₦1 billion increase in FS as measured by total assets will 
lead to ₦9.78 decrease in net assets per share of the listed food and beverages firms in Nigeria.  
4.2.4 Results of Test of Hypotheses  
Statement of Hypothesis One 
Ho1: The size of the Board of Directors has negative relationship with profitability of food and beverages firms in 
Nigeria. 
HA1: The size of the Board of Directors has positive relationship with profitability of food and beverages firms in 
Nigeria. 
To test this hypothesis, two prediction models from the results of the regression estimates were used. This is as 
shown in appendix 3 comprising of table 3.1 to table 3.2 and as summarized in appendix 4. Prediction model 1 is 
used to test whether the size of the board of directors has a positive relationship with profitability as measured by 
return on equity which shows the reported t – statistics value of 1.834223 and associated probability value of 
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0.0702 at the 5% (0.05) level of significance and it implies that there is a positive but statistically insignificant 
relationship between board size and return on equity. Therefore, null hypothesis (Ho1) is rejected, while, the 
alternative hypothesis is accepted. Prediction model 2 tests whether the size of the board of directors has a positive 
relationship with profitability as measured by net assets per share. The reported t – statistics value of 4.038630 and 
the associated probability value of 0.0001 at 5% (0.05) level of significance show that there is a positive and 
statistically significant relationship between board size and net assets per share. Therefore, null hypothesis is 
rejected. In summary, it is safe to conclude that the size of the board of directors has a positive relationship with 
profitability of food and beverages firms in Nigeria.  
Statement of Hypothesis Two      
Ho2: The board composition is negatively associated with profitability of food and beverages firms in Nigeria.  
HA2: The board composition is positively associated with profitability of food and beverages firms in Nigeria. 
To test this hypothesis, two prediction models from the results of the regression estimates were used. This is as 
shown in appendix 3 containing table 3.1 to table 3.2 and as summarized in table 4 of appendix 4. Prediction model 
1 is used to test whether board composition is positively associated with profitability as measured by return on 
equity. The reported t – statistics value of -0.312521 with corresponding probability value of 0.7554 and the 5% 
(0.05) level of significance shows that there is a negative but statistically insignificant association between board 
composition and return on equity. Therefore, null hypothesis (Ho2) is accepted. Prediction model 2 is used to test 
whether board composition is positively associated with profitability as measured by net assets per share. The 
value of t – statistics obtained is 0.355852 with the corresponding probability value of 0.7229 and at the 5% (0.05) 
level of significance. This shows that there is positive but statistically insignificant association between board 
composition and net assets per share. Therefore, null hypothesis (Ho2) is rejected, while, alternative hypothesis 
(HA2) is accepted. In summary, the results of the association between board composition and profitability are 
mixed. Thus, it is safe to settle that the association between board composition and profitability of food and 
beverages firms in Nigeria is inconclusive.    
Statement of Hypothesis Three 
Ho3: Board skills and competence has negative relationship with profitability of food and beverages firms in 
Nigeria.  
HA3: Board skills and competence has positive relationship with profitability of food and beverages firms in 
Nigeria.  
To test this hypothesis, two prediction models from the results of the regression estimates were used. This 
is as shown in appendix 3 containing table 3.1 to table 3.2 and as summarized in table 4 of appendix 4. Prediction 
model 1 is used to test whether board skills and competence has a positive relationship with profitability as 
measured by return on equity. The value of t – statistics obtained is -1.322723 with associated probability value of 
0.1896 and the 5% (0.05) level of significance indicates that there is negative and statistically insignificant 
relationship between board skills and competence and return on equity. Hence, null hypothesis (Ho3) is accepted. 
Prediction model 2 is employed to test whether board skills and competence has a positive relationship with 
profitability as measured by net assets per share. The obtained t – statistics value of -2.556449 with associated 
probability value of 0.0124 and the 5% (0.05) level of significance shows negative but statistically significant 
relationship between board skills and competence and net assets per share. Thus, it is clearly convenient to 
conclude that board skills and competence has negative relationship with profitability of food and beverages firms 
in Nigeria.  
Statement of Hypothesis Four 
Ho4: There is negative correlation between board gender diversity and profitability of food and beverages firms 
in Nigeria.  
HA4: There is positive correlation between board gender diversity and profitability of food and beverages firms in 
Nigeria.  
To test this hypothesis, two prediction models from the results of the regression estimates were used. This is as 
shown in appendix 3 containing table 3.1 to table 3.2 and as summarized in table 4 of appendix 4. Prediction model 
1 is employed to test whether there is positive correlation between board gender diversity and return on equity. 
The reported t – statistics value of 1.512930 with associated probability value of 0.1341 and the 5% (0.05) level 
of significance indicates positive but statistically insignificant correlation between board gender diversity and 
return on equity. Hence, null hypothesis (Ho4) is rejected. Prediction model 2 is used to test whether there is a 
positive correlation between board gender diversity and net assets per share. The obtained t – statistics value of 
2.822992 with associated probability value of 0.0060 and the 5% (0.05) level of significance shows positive and 
statistically significant correlation between board gender diversity and net assets per share. Therefore, null 
hypothesis (Ho4) is rejected. Thus, it is safe to conclude that there is positive correlation between board gender 
diversity and profitability of food and beverages firms in Nigeria.  
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4.3 Discussion of the Empirical Findings 
This section discusses the empirical results from the panel regression estimates based on the pooled Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) reported in the appendix 3 and summarized in appendix 4. Considerably, the estimated coefficient 
of the size of the board of directors turns out to a positive but statistically insignificantly related to return on equity 
and similarly it shows a positive and strongly significant with net assets per share. Hence, the results are sufficient 
to submit that a positive relationship exists between size of board of directors and profitability of food and 
beverages firms in Nigeria. This implies that the larger the size of the board of directors, the higher the profitability 
of the companies. The rationale for a positive relationship between board size and profitability indicators – return 
on equity and net assets per share may be because directors own part of the company’s equity (Okougbo, 2011:61). 
It is therefore plausible to argue that as the board increases in size, the newly appointed directors are allocated 
shares leading to both increase in equity and monitoring function that will reduce operational costs while profit 
increases, thereby improving the amount of equity. The positive relationship of board size with the profitability 
surrogates – ROE and NAPS advocates that companies’ board of directors with large size enjoy higher profit 
compared to the firms’ board of directors with small board size. This finding suggests that larger board of directors 
take advantage of their number in ensuring effective corporate governance process and this leads to increase 
production and reduction of operating expenses. This is in support of resource dependency theory. The proponents 
of large board size are of the view that it provides an increase pool of experience, knowledge, skills and diversity 
at their disposal to make better decisions and also capable of reducing the dominance of an overbearing MD/CEO 
and hence puts necessary checks and balances (Forbes and Milliken, 1991; Pfeffer, 1983; Pearce and Zahra, 1992; 
Goodstein, et al. 1994). However, this finding is inconsistent with agency, shareholder value and value-synergy 
approaches. 
Board composition reported negative and statistically insignificant association with return on equity and 
positive but statistically insignificant association with net assets per share. The results obtained show a mixed and 
inconclusive relationship between board composition and firm profitability. This implies that an independent board 
may help or may not help to improve the level of profitability of the listed food and beverages firms in Nigeria. 
The result of negative association of board composition with profitability surrogate – return on equity suggests 
that improved profitability of the food and beverages firms in Nigeria is not dependent on increasing the proportion 
of non-executive directors serving on the board of the companies. More so, the result implies that when there are 
more external board members serving on the board, return on equity of the food and beverages firms in Nigeria 
tends to worse off. This result is not in support of the 2003, 2011 and 2015 codes of corporate governance in 
Nigeria, agency theory and shareholder value theory that believe that effectiveness of board of directors can be 
enhanced by increasing the proportion of outside directors serving on the board. Instead, the result is in support of 
stewardship theory and value-synergy approach that seek for less proportion of non-executive directors serving on 
the board, particularly, the value-synergy approach advocates for increase in the size of management team, instead. 
This result is consistent with Siladi (2006) and Tornyeva and Wereko (2012) view that board composition is 
ineffective because non-executive directors are too busy with other commitments and Bosch (1995) believes that 
they put less time and less than average efforts in discharging their duties; they can create problems of information 
and have limited scope (White, 2013; Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990). The result is also consistent with findings 
of Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) who suggest that boards expanded for political reasons often result in too many 
outsiders on the board, which does not help performance. However, the result of positive association between 
board composition and profitability surrogate – net assets per share suggests that improved profitability of the food 
and beverages firms in Nigeria depends on increasing the proportion of non-executive directors serving on the 
board of the companies. This supports the view that independent non-executive directors are crucial to the growth 
and the survival of firms and according to Dehaene, et al. (2001); Connelly and Limpaphayon, (2004); Uadiale 
(2010), the larger proportion of board composition can positively influence firm profitability and encourage more 
intensive audits (O’Sullivan, 2000). Nonetheless, it could therefore be that the negative empirical result the board 
composition has with return on equity of the sample companies could be due to ineffective board communication 
and information flow; poor induction, training and development programmes for the board members; high rate of 
multiple directorships among the independent non-executive directors; appointing two or more members of non-
executive directors from the same family to sit on the board at the same time; not seeking and obtaining external 
professional advice in the discharge of their responsibilities; inability of the company management to provide 
necessary information in a timely manner to the members of independent non-executive directors; excessive 
familiarity of the members of independent non-executive directors with the senior management/CEO – which is a 
threat to their independence; not including a sizeable number of independent non-executive directors in the risk 
management committee; flaws in the appointment process of independent directors; ineffective implementations 
of the recommendations of the independent non-executive directors by the boards; independent non-executive 
directors having significant ownership stake in the company; poor attendance of board committee meetings due to 
multiple directorships or other outside commitments; mismatching of skills and competence; ineffective 
performance evaluation of the boards and individual directors; appointment of independent non-executive directors 
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without considering experience, specialist knowledge and personal qualities; non-executive directors not involving 
in constructive challenge and contribution to the development of the strategy of the company; not having unfettered 
access to the key officers of the company or management team.  
Board skills and competence reported negative and statistically insignificant relationship with return on 
equity and net assets per share. The results clearly indicate negative relationship with profitability of food and 
beverages firms in Nigeria. This result is inconsistent with value-synergy approach, stakeholder theory and 
resource dependence that believe that board members are embodiments of value, expertise, knowledge and 
experience needed to make firms perform better; and help board to challenge conventional thinking and question 
current practices (Coulson – Thomas, 2007). More so, the negative results contradicted the invisible power of 
skills and competence as a critical asset in generating high returns and increase profits from the assets base of the 
food and beverages firms in Nigeria. But, this does not mean that board skills and competence is not must possess 
dire advantage for higher performance of firm. According to Power (1991), it could be due to the occupational and 
professional affiliations of highly qualified directors which may increase agency behaviour. Ideally, if directors 
and managers should demonstrate the utmost good faith and integrity required of them, then higher skill levels 
should bring about higher corporate performance (Tornyeva and Wereko, 2012). Further, the negative relationship 
is not due to the fact that skills and competence is not the pillar for enhancing board effectiveness for high firm 
performance, but it might be as a result of the inability of the directors to personally maintain and enhance their 
competence, as well as failure to identify and address gaps in their own and the board’s collective competence. It 
might also be that the boards’ nomination committees of food and beverages firms in Nigeria were not able to 
recruit and select the right mix of skills, capabilities, experiences and attitudes to deliver the right outcomes to 
stakeholders. More so, other likely causes to the negative relationship include: inability to take proactively 
individual and collective responsibility for ensuring that market knowledge, technical knowledge, and professional 
skills of directors are maintained; failure to remain aware of economic conditions, industry developments and 
changes in the company’s strategic direction; board comprising of inappropriate diverse group of directors that are 
not able to possess collectively the technical skills, conceptual skills, human relations skills and attitudes require 
to deliver the best outcomes for stakeholders; inability of the board to exercise fully inclusive leadership approach; 
failure of the board as a group to maintain up to date competency in its areas of supervision through continuing 
professional developments, consultation, and other procedures in conformance with current standards of industry; 
failure of the directors as a group to translate their competencies into economic reality; mismatching of skills and 
competence; lack of understanding of the power of effective board skills and competence as a prime factor that 
contributes to better board performance; appointing directors on the board without a clear understanding of the 
specific job they are supposed to perform and without receiving any written information about their roles, 
responsibilities, expectations and accountabilities; appointing directors to serve for their influence or affluence 
rather than on the basis of predetermined competencies; poor performance of the board chairman in ensuring that 
the board and its committees are composed of the relevant skills, competencies and desired experience. 
Board gender diversity is used as proxy for board diversity. It reported positive but weak correlation with 
profitability indicators – return on equity, as well as positive and statistically significant with net assets per share. 
This indicates that a positive relationship does exist between board gender diversity and profitability of food and 
beverages firms in Nigeria. The positive relationship of board gender with profitability implies that Nigerian food 
and beverages firms with higher proportion of women directors on the board are more committed to ensuring for 
improved performance of the firm and that larger number of women directors serving on the board will ensure 
effective corporate governance process that will enhance reduction of operating expenses to improve profitability. 
This is as it will bring new ideas and different perspectives to the firm as well as the company will benefit from 
more diversity of thought, commitment and purpose. The positive and weak relationship could also mean that the 
presence of women as directors on the boards of food and beverages firms in Nigeria will help to increase the 
sector profitability. The positive result is supported by different theoretical perspectives: shareholder theory, 
agency theory, resource dependency theory, political theory and value-synergy approach that believe that diversity 
opens the arms of linkage, value, transparency, independence and accountability which are necessary for better 
performance. Many authors and previous studies have supported board gender diversity (Langevoort, 2011; 
Luckerath – Rovers, 2011; SCGN, 2014; Ijas, 2012; Valsan, 2013; Erhardt, et al. 2003; Catalyst, 2007; McKinsey, 
2007). 
Finally, the firm size comes out with a negative and statistically insignificant in all statistic panel models 
with profitability surrogates – ROE and NAPS indicating that firm size as measured by total assets has negative 
and weak relationship with profitability of food and beverages firms in Nigeria. The results obtained for firm size 
do not let the investigator conclude that firm size has an influence on firm profitability. It shows that Nigerian food 
and beverages firms with high amount of non-current assets do not have any relationship that could affect 
profitability. It might also be that the non-current assets of the firms are weak and old to put the companies into 
sustainable path of success and growth. Consequently, it will generate heavy operating expenses and inefficiency 
which in turn will lead to significant erosion of revenue and at last to slim profitability. The result is consistent 
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with previous studies (Goddard, Tavakoli, and Wilson, 2005; Nunes and Serrasquerro, 2008). However, it 
contradicted with some other investigations that found that firm size as measured by total assets has positive 
relationship with profitability (Okougbo, 2011; Lee, 2009; Omondi and Muturi, 2013; Babalola, 2013). 
 
5.0 SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS   
5.1.0 Findings of the Study 
This study was based on qualitative and quantitative approaches to research. Therefore, findings made were 
classified into two: theoretical findings and empirical findings.   
5.1.1 Summary of Theoretical Findings 
Having conducted a laparotomy of codes of corporate governance in Nigeria, its regulatory framework, and 
examination of different theoretical perspectives and models, certain theoretical findings on the nature of 
relationship between corporate governance and profitability of food and beverages firms in Nigeria are 
summarized as follows: 
1. The examination of size of the board of directors of the sample companies ranging from the minimum 
number of 7 to maximum of 14 directors suggests that the food and beverages firms in Nigeria prefer 
large size of boards to small size of board. The implication is that large boards increase the firm’s 
profitability more than small boards. The view of large board is consistent with the resource dependency 
theory that proposes that boards are sources of linkages of the firms. This view of resource dependency 
theory about the board is also in agreement with the provisions of codes of corporate governance in 
Nigeria which allows large board size. However, the view of large board size is inconsistent with agency 
theory, shareholder value theory and value-synergy approaches, which suggest that involvement of large 
board size, will increase agency cost and make decision process difficult, lead to waste of much energy 
and time and may allow board to be manipulated by management. 
2. As regards to board composition of the sample companies, the independent director composition ranges 
from the minimum of 46% to the maximum of 86% and on average of 70% shows that food and beverages 
firms in Nigeria have an adequate number of outside directors serving on their boards. However, this 
could not have resulted into better performance measures in the industry. Suffice this to say that, high 
board composition does not necessarily imply increase in profitability of food and beverages firms in 
Nigeria; as chances of the non-executive directors not to be efficient are high. Therefore, a higher 
proportion of independent directors do not guarantee increase in firm profitability in the sample 
companies. Whereas, the agency theory, shareholder value theory and the codes of corporate governance 
in Nigeria all assume that the more number of independent directors a firm will have the better the 
profitability of the firm. 
3. The appointment of directors with only educational degree and/or professional qualifications on the board 
of directors of the sample companies could not give rise to improved profitability in the two models. The 
results could not support resource dependency theory, value-synergy approach, stakeholder theory and 
the code of corporate governance in Nigeria that give credence for recruitment of competent, 
knowledgeable and experience persons as directors. 
4. Even though the proportion of women directors serving on the board of directors of food and beverages 
firms in Nigeria is very small as it ranges from the minimum proportion of 0 per cent to maximum of 29 
per cent and on average of 6 per cent, it does appear that board gender diversity helps to improve the 
profitability level of the sample companies. The implication is that the more female directors that are 
appointed to serve on the board of directors of food and beverages firms in Nigeria, the better the 
profitability of the firms. This positive relationship result is in support of the provisions of code of 
corporate governance in Nigeria that encourages for selection of board members on the basis of diversity. 
This is also consistent with agency, stakeholder, resource dependency, political and value-synergy 
perspectives of corporate governance. 
5.1.2 Summary of Empirical Findings  
The study, in addition to theoretical evidence, provides empirical support of the relationship between corporate 
governance and profitability of firms as summarized below: 
1. Board size has a positive and insignificant relationship with return on equity and statistically significantly 
positive relationship with net assets per share of food and beverages firms in Nigeria implying that board 
size influences the profitability parameters in the firms; as such, the larger the board size, the higher the 
firm profitability. This is consistent with the empirical findings of previous studies (Kashif, 2008; 
Zubaidah, Nurmala, and Kamaruzaman, 2009; Tornyeva and Wereko, 2012; Okougbo, 2011; Mutalib, 
2012; Babatunde and Olaniran, 2009; Tanko and Kolawole, 2007; Uadiale, 2010; Dabor, et al. 2015). 
2. Empirical results reveal that board composition has negative and statistically insignificant relationship 
with return on equity and by implication increase in number of independent non-executive directors 
serving on the board of food and beverages firms in Nigeria will reduce the profitability of the firms. The 
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negative relationship between corporate management and profitability in this study has the support of 
previous studies (Tornyeva and Wereko, 2012; Dalton, et al. 1998; Dabor, et al. 2015; Oluwafemi, et al. 
2013; Babatunde and Olaniran, 2009). However, board composition shows a positive but statistically 
insignificant association with net assets per share. This indicates that increase in the number of non-
executive directors will lead to higher net assets per share of food and beverages firms in Nigeria; this 
result is consistent with agency and shareholder theories.  
3. Furthermore, the study observes that the relationships between board skills and competence with 
profitability indexes – return on equity and net assets per share show negative and statistically 
insignificant results. This result is inconsistent with all theories and codes of corporate governance.  
4. The study equally observes that board diversity proxy – board gender diversity does have positive but 
statistically insignificant correlation with return on equity as well as strong positive correlation with net 
assets per share. The implication is that the larger the number of female directors serving on the board of 
food and beverages firms in Nigeria, the better the performance of those profitability surrogates. This 
finding is consistent with previous studies (Erhardt, et al. 2003; Bathula, 2008; Rose, 2007; Chiang, 2005; 
Luckerath-Rovers, 2011). 
5. Finally, the regression results show that firm size as measured by total assets has negative and statistically 
insignificant relationship with profitability of food and beverages firms in Nigeria. This is consistent with 
the findings of previous studies (Goddard, Tavakoli, and Wilson, 2005; Nunes and Serrasqueiro, 2008). 
 
5.2 Limitations of the Study 
Like most research efforts the current study has some limitations that provide opportunities for future researchers 
to address.  
1. Corporate governance is a vast concept and is difficult to measure with objectivity and hence measure 
used in this study may be subjective and not a comprehensive measure. 
2. A limited number of corporate governance mechanisms were examined. The study could not investigate 
other corporate governance characteristics due to data constraints, time and space, among other factors. 
Consequently, important elements such as insider ownership, board committees, ownership structure, 
Chairman/CEO duality, CEO’s remuneration disclosure and frequency of board meetings, among other 
factors could not be included. Future researchers may benefit from including additional corporate 
governance mechanisms. 
3. The study focus corporate governance mechanisms mainly on board structure without bringing elements 
of board process in the investigation. Future researchers may benefit from focusing corporate governance 
mechanisms on board process characteristics. 
4. More so, profitability of a firm is influenced by more factors than just good corporate governance. Issues 
of social, legal, economic and the political environment are equally important. In addition, other various 
control variables such as firm’s age, growth, leverage, risk, Research and Development (R&D), industry, 
etc. have not been incorporated in the analysis. More so, the firm size measurement considered was total 
assets. Further study should consider number of employees and volume of sales. It is therefore suggested 
that future research should consider some of these factors exploring the impact of corporate governance 
on firm profitability. 
5. The current study is limited in the scope because it focused mainly on finding the relationship of corporate 
governance and profitability of listed foods and beverages firms in Nigeria. This may possibly limit a 
wide applicability of the study to other companies not listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange. Also, the 
sample survey is companies in Nigeria and may not be applicable to other country context. 
6. Also, the study considered only one sector of listed firms in Nigeria. Future studies can incorporate 
different sectors and can also find differences in those sectors related to corporate governance structures 
and their relationship with firm profitability. 
7. Market-based measures such as share prices, stock returns, and market value of firm, among others have 
been ignored in place of accounting based measures. 
8. The research considered non-executive directors and independent directors as one indicator in 
determining board composition. Whereas the code 2003 and 2011 SEC provides for them differently. 
Any further research that separates board composition in terms of non-executive directors and 
independent directors would add more benefits to the literature. 
9. The study gave all the theories in corporate governance with equal chance to their views, and as such, did 
not consider any particular one as the main focus. Consequently, the investigation could not expect any 
signs for the regression coefficients of the explanatory variables. Future researchers may benefit from 
focusing corporate governance indicators on a particular theory and ascribes signs to the regression 
coefficients based on the view of the theory.  
10. Finally, the research did examine firm’s performance only from profitability or financial performance 
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perspective. Future research would benefit from the examination of performance from non-financial 
perspective and of the relationship between corporate governance characteristics and performance across 
the firms. 
Despite the limitations, it is hoped that this study would provide an important contribution to the corpus of 
corporate governance literature.  
 
5.3 Practical Implications of the Study 
The results from the study show that the food and beverages firms in Nigeria have great opportunities for growth 
and can generate high profitability to meet the interests of all their stakeholders. It also indicates that the industry 
is well positioned to support the economic growth and development of the country. And for Nigeria to keep its 
Gross Domestic Products (GDP) increasing, this sector of the economy must be strongly encouraged to adopt good 
corporate governance practice that would enable it generates more resources to create more employment 
opportunities, support in corporate social responsibility, boost agricultural activities, improve capital markets, 
make robust the banking sector, make the industry globally competitive and attractive, and take the sector to the 




It has been said that, “the cornerstone to corporate governance efforts lies in one basic policy objective: selling the 
concept to the business community. We have to convince businesses that better corporate governance serves them.” 
Effective and robust corporate governance system is an essential feature of successful companies. Against this 
background of examining the relationship between corporate governance and profitability, it is very much the 
purpose of this study to let in some fresh view on the role of corporate management in firm profitability and to 
make recommendations to enhance its effectiveness towards raising the bar for superior corporate performance. 
As a matter of fact, the effectiveness and efficiency of any company is a function of the quality of corporate 
government adopted in the organization. Adoption of good corporate governance practices enhances transparency 
of company’s operations, ensures accountability, improves risk management and increases firm’s profitability. 
More so, it promotes cooperation among the stakeholders of the firm, and most importantly, aligns the interest of 
shareholders with that of the managers, and opens the gate for corporate success. From this study, the conceptual 
and empirical findings hold that on average, corporate governance has positive relationship with profitability of 
food and beverages firms in Nigeria. Most of the corporate governance characteristics of board size, board 
composition and board gender diversity employed in the study reveal positive correlation with the profitability of 
food and beverages firms in Nigeria, in exception of the board skill and competence. Despite this result, the 
findings show that the food and beverages firms must have large board size with wide range of diversity and gender 
consideration, and must also be independent from the management of the company as well as galvanized with right 
skills and competence to bring the desired turn around in the companies. This would help to give the board the 
strategic control and direction. Also, this research work, “promotes acceptance of corporate governance, no longer 
as something of ‘borrowed’ discipline, but as a way of running enterprises that takes sensitive account of the needs 
and imperatives of corporate practice in Nigeria.” Finally, corporate governance and profitability are the twilight 
zone of a firm. Together, they establish system of rules and measurement of performances, and ensure continuous 
coexistence of all interest groups. Suffice this to say that, corporate governance is not only a technique. It is also 
a hope. It is the hope that common ground and common good can be found, forged and expressed between 
stakeholders and between economies, despite their differences in corporate objectives. It is the hope that common 
appropriate behaviour can be found to restore public confidence of corporations from action plans and internal 
controls to performance measurement and corporate disclosure of every organization. This hope is anchored on 
persons who are charged with the sole responsibility of keeping the flagship of corporations strongly fluttering. 
The hope that, guided by reason and aware of the fragility of corporate life, “human beings are capable of valuing 
what brings them together, rather than what keeps them apart”. Truly, it is the hope that strikes ‘the balance 
between economic and social goals’, and aligns ‘as nearly as possible the interests of individuals, corporations and 
society’. It is the hope of economic justice, fairness and equity among the stakeholders. Be that as it may, “this 
hope, we all know it, this hope is not self-fulfilling”. It will only come true if we have the strength for ‘intellectual 
honesty’, and sometimes also the uncommon courage and humility, to make possible, and to oppose and reconcile 
the conflicting self-imposing interests of stakeholders that too often and too easily puts our corporate goals asleep. 
Lest it shall be late, we urge every legitimate interest holder to keep the hope determinedly alive, viable, vibrant 
and growing by standing for good corporate governance that serves as a system of checks and balances for a better 
firm profitability at all times. 
 
5.5 Recommendations  
The submissions made in this study are based on the major research findings in the course of establishing the 
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relationship between corporate governance and profitability of food and beverages firms in Nigeria. They are 
highlighted as follows: 
1. This study has confirmed that corporate governance has a linear relationship with firm profitability. 
Therefore, the issues of corporate governance should be considered as important as profit making since 
it is a key factor in maximizing shareholders and other stakeholders’ value. As a matter of fact, nomination 
and governance committee should be composed of as provided by section 8.12.4 of the 2015 NCCG as 
well as ensure that as provided by section 8.12.5 of the 2015 NCCG, that a separate section of the annual 
report should be used to describe the work of the committee, including the process it uses in relation to 
board appointments. 
2. The findings made in this study have clearly shown that profitability parameters are linked with good 
corporate governance. Therefore, any fall in profitability should be considered as a dangerous signal and 
the corporate board should investigate into it immediately without compromise. 
3. The finding from the study also indicates that the food and beverages firms in Nigeria have strength in 
large board size as increase in board size will increase their key profitability ratios. Therefore, the board 
should dwell on this by appointing more resourceful persons on the board and considering majorly 
diversity, knowledge and competence as well as ‘intellectual honesty’ of the persons. 
4. The result on the board composition suggests that the food and beverages firms in Nigeria should reduce 
the proportion of board composition as well as review the process of enhancing the effectiveness of non-
executive directors on their boards. Also, the negative impact of independent directors on the profitability 
of the firms could also be addressed by improving board education, ensuring more communication and 
information flow effectiveness, not basing appointment of independent non-executive directors on family 
ties, political associates, or on other subjective approach. The firms should also adopt the provision of 
Derek Higg’s Report of mandating any person prior to appointment, potential new non-executive 
directors to carry out due diligence on the board and on the company to satisfy themselves that they have 
the knowledge, skills, experience and time to make a positive contribution to the board. 
5. The result of board gender diversity also suggest that the boards of food and beverages firm should 
endeavour to increase the quota of women directors serving on the board as this will help to boost the 
profitability potency of the companies and ensure operating efficiency, improved quality product and 
pricing efficiency. 
6. Board of food and beverages firms should go extra-mile in providing regular educational training and 
development to improve the skills and competence of not just the board members, also the management 
team and the rest of the workforce. This is necessary to reaffirm the uniqueness of the industry through 
building mind-sets that can sustain the industry; provide innovation and creativity required to 
continuously rebranding the business products, ensuring price efficiency, improved productivity and 
motivation for tireless efforts. Developing their skills and competence has become very necessary because 
innovation is a product of education and education reboots the fire of innovation; and whenever a person 
catches the fire of innovation, a new product is borne and the existing ones become rebranded.  
7. The Financial Reporting Council of Nigeria in collaboration with the Securities of Exchange Commission 
and Nigerian Stock Exchange should introduce the use of Corporate Governance Indices (CGIs) to 
measure the level of Corporate Governance Compliance by public companies in Nigeria. 
8. The idea of issuing external auditors’ certificate on corporate governance as it is applicable in India and 
other countries of the world should be emulated by the country’s code of corporate governance regulator. 
This concept should be introduced to the publicly listed companies in Nigeria; as a mandatory requirement 
that should form part of every company’s annual reports and accounts. The external auditors should be 
required to give a certificate on the compliance of corporate governance provisions for public companies. 
9. There is need to develop a meaningful evaluation tool for regular appraisal of boards of directors as a 
whole and individual directors. This would help to create helpful credibility and acceptance for the 
corporate governance practice in the Nigerian firms. The modality and the performance of the evaluation 
should be communicated to the investors during the Annual General Meeting and formed part of the 
companies’ Annual Reports and Accounts. Independent Appraisal body should be allowed to carry out 
the exercise. Thus, there is need to develop quantitative appraisal model for determining board of directors 
and individual director effectiveness. 
10. Enforceability and sanctions provisions made in the exposure draft of 2015 National Code of Corporate 
Governance for private sectors should be well defined. Section 37 of the 2015 NCCG should categorically 
state the person(s) that can pursue for the enforceability of the National code. Also, it should clearly spell 
out the applicable sanctions against any violator of the code. This will help make the code to be taken 
more serious and increase the level of its compliance. 
11. The Financial Reporting Council of Nigeria should provide for the minimum required educational 
qualifications, skills, knowledge and experience for an individual to be appointed into the board of a 
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company. This will serve as a standard criterion for the appointment and evaluation of a person on the 
board. Statutory and regulatory bodies should ensure that at least quoted firms appoint directors with 
threshold competency on the boards. The individual director should be able to demonstrate inclusive 
leadership acumen of transparency, empowerment, accountability, courage and humility (TEACH). 
 
5.6 Suggestions for Further Research 
In the course of the study, areas that further research could be conducted were opened. For more validity of findings, 
the other non-financial sectors of the economy like pharmaceutical, personal and household; transportation; hotels 
and lodges, etc. should be included in a similar study; as well as testing other corporate governance characteristics 
other than the ones used in this study. Also, market based performance indicators can be explained rather than 
using only accounting based measures. More so, all the areas identified as limitations of this study in chapter five 
provided promising avenue for further studies. In general, there is need for an empirical study to be conducted on 
corporate governance using board process mechanisms and profitability. Other areas that need further research 
include: Investigating the applicability of value-synergy perspective in corporate governance and performance; 
Code of Corporate Governance Compliance and Performance in Nigeria as well as extending this empirical study 
to public sector organizations in Nigeria.  
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APPENDIX 1 
TABLE 1:           Result of the Descriptive Statistics Analysis 
 ROE NAPS BS BC BSC BGD FS 
 Mean  0.072911  13.19059  1.002208  0.698195  1.000000  0.064861  10.60864 
 Median  0.248050  10.03500  1.079180  0.714300  1.000000  0.000000  10.74710 
 Maximum  3.025500  51.21360  1.146130  0.857140  1.000000  0.285700  11.47783 
 Minimum -20.71000 -2.757000  0.845100  0.461500  1.000000  0.000000  9.409880 
 Std. Dev.  2.302489  11.43704  0.110157  0.121762  0.000000  0.089891  0.781449 
 Skewness -8.472508  1.072277 -0.349146 -0.256934  NA  1.179289 -0.517178 
 Kurtosis  77.22760  3.794978  1.480040  1.960026  NA  3.249597  1.763224 
        
Jarque-Bera  21255.19  19.18072  10.25893  4.933892  NA  20.62569  9.531524 
Probability  0.000000  0.000068  0.005920  0.084844  NA  0.000033  0.008516 
        
Sum  6.416165  1160.772  88.19427  61.44116  88.00000  5.707810  933.5602 
Sum Sq. Dev.  461.2267  11380.11  1.055710  1.289864  0.000000  0.702997  53.12770 
        
Observations 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 
Cross sections 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
 
                                                                      APPENDIX 2  
             TABLE 2:                    Correlation Matrix: Test for Multicollinearity                                            
GUI 7UP FMILL NNFMILL NESTLE CADBURY NB UTC 
 
1 0.250457 -0.267045 0.461874 -0.064076 -0.050372 -0.342959 -0.112533 
     
    0.250457 1 0.106908 -0.147754 -0.094187 0.214834 -0.235208 -0.107530 
 
-0.267045 0.106908 1 -0.398557 -0.251158 -0.071494 0.141320 0.038906 
 
    0.461874 -0.147754 -0.398557 1 -0.200253 -0.271709 -0.326962 -0.276648 
  
-0.064076 -0.094187 -0.251158 -0.200253 1 -0.366112 -0.184161 -0.142647 
 
-0.050373 0.214835 -0.071494 -0.271709 -0.366120 1 -0.155099 0.127425 
 
-0.342960 -0.235209 0.141321 -0.326962 -0.184161 -0.155099 1 -0.147744 
 
-0.112534 -0.107530 0.038906 -0.276648 -0.142647 0.127425 -0.147743 1 
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Table 3.1: Analysis of Result of Regression Estimates for Prediction Model 1 
Dependent Variable: ROE   
Method: Pooled Least Squares   
Date: 11/27/15   Time: 22:46   
Sample: 2004 – 2014   
Included observations: 11   
Cross-sections included: 8   
Total pool (balanced) observations: 88  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     BS 4.945574 2.696277 1.834223 0.0702 
BC -0.669708 2.142920 -0.312521 0.7554 
BSC -4.722703 3.570439 -1.322723 0.1896 
BGD 4.761343 3.147102 1.512930 0.1341 
FS -1.99E-06 2.53E-05 -0.078709 0.9375 
     
     R-squared 0.054391    Mean dependent var 0.072911 
Adjusted R-squared 0.008819    S.D. dependent var 2.302489 
S.E. of regression 2.292313    Akaike info criterion 4.552140 
Sum squared resid 436.1402    Schwarz criterion 4.692898 
Log likelihood -195.2942    Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.608848 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.323135    
     
         *Significant at 5% (0.05) level of significance 
            *Source: E – Views version 8.0 
 
Table 3.2: Analysis of Result of Regression Estimates for Prediction Model 2 
*Significant at 5% (0.05) level of significance 





Dependent Variable: NAPS   
Method: Pooled Least Squares   
Date: 11/27/15   Time: 22:48   
Sample: 2004 -  2014   
Included observations: 11   
Cross-sections included: 8   
Total pool (balanced) observations: 88  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     BS 50.01826 12.38496 4.038630 0.0001 
BC 3.502719 9.843194 0.355852 0.7229 
BSC -41.92652 16.40029 -2.556449 0.0124 
BGD 40.80849 14.45575 2.822992 0.0060 
FS -9.78E-05 0.000116 -0.841210 0.4026 
     
     R-squared 0.191389    Mean dependent var 13.19059 
Adjusted R-squared 0.152420    S.D. dependent var 11.43704 
S.E. of regression 10.52941    Akaike info criterion 7.601362 
Sum squared resid 9202.082    Schwarz criterion 7.742119 
Log likelihood -329.4599    Hannan-Quinn criter. 7.658069 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.014231    
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                                                                         APPENDIX 4 
Table 4: Summary and Conclusion of Results of Regression Estimates for the Relationship between 
Corporate Governance and Profitability of Listed Food and Beverages Firms in Nigeria for the period of 
11 years, spanning from 2004 – 2014. 
Variable ROE NAPS Conclusion 




The size of the board of directors has a positive 
relationship with profitability of food and 








There are mixed and inconclusive results between 
board composition and profitability of food and 
beverages firms in Nigeria. 







Board skills and competence has negative 
relationship with profitability of food and 







There is positive correlation between board gender 
diversity and profitability of food and beverages 
firms in Nigeria. 




There is negative and weak relationship between 
firm size and profitability of food and beverages 
firms in Nigeria. 
*Significant at 5% (0.05) level of significance 
                 *Source: E – views version 8.0 
